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Anglican Theological Review



EDITED BY

FREDERICK C. GRANT and BURTON S. EASTON

FOUNDED BY SAMUEL A. B. MERCER

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CONTENTS

Fundamentalist Catholicism: An Open Letter to an Anglo-Catholic	Theodore O. Wedel 161
The Difficulty With Democracy	Herbert H. Gowen 182
The Ministry in the World Today (Church Congress Syllabus VII, Part 4)	W. Norman Pittenger 195
The Mystery of Time in the Mirror of Faith ..	Richard Kroner 204
The Date of the Last Supper	Samuel I. Feigin 212
Papias and the Gospels	Robert M. Grant 218
"Greek in Jewish Palestine"	Arthur Darby Nock 223
"Marcion and the New Testament"	Sherman E. Johnson 228
Book Reviews	234
Notes on New Books	248

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FUNDAMENTALIST CATHOLICISM

AN OPEN LETTER TO AN ANGLO-CATHOLIC

By THEODORE O. WEDEL

College of Preachers

You and I had a heated discussion on Church reunion the other evening. I had not fully realized before how this issue threatens to unleash emotional controversy in the Episcopal Church family. Argument was no longer calm. I now venture to discuss this issue in more restrained mood. For, while I differ with you, I nevertheless feel that your views must be dealt with seriously. They ought to be of concern not merely to the members of the Episcopal churches among Christian communions, but to all churchmen interested in the ecumenical movement. Anglo-catholics are numerically a small fraction of non-Roman Christianity. But they are the spokesmen, in the ecumenical movement, for half or more of Christendom. They are closer to Protestants than are representatives of the Orthodox Churches and can, consequently, represent the catholic tradition more volubly. They carry a cutting edge in controversy. The ecumenical movement cannot afford to ignore them. Sooner or later, this movement must come face to face with the most important of all of the schisms of Church history—the Reformation revolt itself.

Within Anglicanism, the Anglo-catholic party has exercised an influence for a hundred years transcending that of any other group. It has not converted the Episcopal churches now scattered over the world to its full position. But no member of any of these churches has

escaped its powerful impact—and this not merely in matters of ritual or worship externals, but in basic thinking about the nature of the Church. No precise description of the ethos of Anglo-catholicism is easy, nor is it necessary for my purpose. Suffice it to say that, beginning with the Oxford movement of a century ago, its leading representatives have attempted to reclaim for Anglicanism its catholic, as over against its Reformation, heritage.

I myself owe Anglo-catholicism a great debt. It once offered to me, and to hundreds like myself, an oasis in the desert of modernist Liberalism. Twenty or more years ago, when we were groping for a spiritual anchorage, no other could easily be found. Protestantism, as we then knew it, offered only two unacceptable alternatives—a Fundamentalism impossible to the university-bred, or an ethical sentimentalism equally impossible. Most of us had left our Fundamentalist back-grounds, and could not go back. But the humanitarian Christianity which then typified for us the best which Protestantism seemed to offer, made little or no appeal either. Many of us tried it and found it wanting in intellectual foundations. It seemed to us to be Christianity increasingly without God—a man-made good-will society, unrealistic, without roots in tradition. The choice in the Protestant world tempted many either to Rome or to a half-cynical humanism. Anglo-catholicism presented a way out. Here was a cult alien to evangelical tradition. Here was a cult-doctrine which never wholly won all of us to full approval. But the Bible was there—a non-Fundamentalist Bible!—and the creeds of Christendom, the symbols and ceremonials of a Christianity refusing surrender to the dogmas of Progress. Dogmatic theology was still taken seriously. In those days, when Harnack's "What is Christianity?" was the typical expression of liberal Christianity, where could we easily have found, outside the Fundamentalist camp, the Gospel of the Christian centuries except in the catholic tradition?

Anglo-catholicism, I repeat, became a haven of refuge. Classical Protestantism was largely unknown to us. The Evangelicals within the Episcopal churches themselves seemed to be ignorant of it. Hence Protestantism, so it seemed to us, was dated. We predicted its debacle. We were filled with missionary zeal for converting a remnant back to the true Christian faith—packaged, to be sure, in the Anglo-catholic wrapper.

But the past twenty or twenty-five years have totally changed the scene. Protestantism is no longer in a debacle—certainly not on its theological side. There has been a resurrection. Catholicism is facing Protestantism as friend or enemy on a wholly shifted battleground. Reformation theology has come gloriously into its own again. Bible and Creed and the "Faith of the Fathers" are being explored and defended from Holland and Switzerland to Union Seminary in New York. What surprises me not a little is that so few Anglo-catholics are aware of the fact. They read the catholic classics of former generations or the (to me) somewhat dreary modern imitations. Many of them have retreated into a mystical prayer life or into a sacramentalism which is in danger of becoming an end in itself. They are woefully behind the times.

Anglo-catholicism, a generation ago, thought it had almost a monopoly of orthodoxy. It does not have that monopoly now. The shoe, in fact, ought to be pinching the other foot. We once accused Protestantism of apostasy from the Christian faith. The revived Reformation theology of our day accuses Catholicism (Roman first, but also Anglo-catholic) of precisely these same heretical tendencies. Above all, this new Protestant orthodoxy accuses the Catholic tradition of Pelagianism. As I read the writings of this school, I must confess that they can make every Anglican very uncomfortable.

I should not dream of accepting the whole dogmatic system of Karl Barth, from whom this contemporary orthodox revival stems. I don't fully understand him, to begin with. But it is not necessary to agree with all one reads in this flood of fresh Biblical theology to know that one is in the presence of a contemporary outpouring of the Holy Spirit. Had this renaissance of Protestantism not happened, some Catholic movement might have won the remnant of Christianity in our modern world. Such a movement cannot win now. The Reformation meant something under God's rule of history. And Catholicism is facing the giants of the Reformation once again—Luther and Calvin—and also modern exemplars of their tradition who have passed (theologically speaking) through fire and sword. I very much doubt that Catholic theologians, by and large, are prepared to do battle. They have lived too long in their fortresses. Nor need a meeting of Catholic and Protestant necessarily mean war. If the Reformation means something in Christian history, so does the Catholic tradition itself. For-

tresses have their uses in times of chaos. Anglo-catholicism will some day be credited with much glory as the Church historian looks back upon the nineteenth century. But a new day is here. The Catholic can come out of his fortress and meet his brother Protestant warrior of the plains, who returns from battle with secularism and modernism to the faith of his fathers. Ours is the day of ecumenical churchmanship in which Catholic and Protestant become one in Christ again.

Only when seen against the background of the theological revolution of the past twenty-five years, do reunion movements make sense. If all of our Anglo-catholic leaders could take a six months' holiday and read the Protestant theological literature of our generation, ecumenical projects might begin to lose a few of their terrors. Of course, we see flaws in this revived Protestantism. Even those sympathetic to it, like A. G. Hebert and his school in Anglicanism, do not give up their Catholic loyalties. But sneers at Protestants would become anathema. Irresponsible talk about Protestant heresies would vanish. We should not be accusing Protestants of having no doctrine of the Church or of the Ministry. We should become gentlemen once more in controversy, as we have not been in at least some recent polemic writing.

The ecumenical movement clearly is God at work in our times. Every Christian should experience a thrill when he reads the great statements of Lausanne or Edinburgh on the uniting faith of the Christian Churches there represented. Far from being a minimum Faith, it is, in many ways, a maximum Faith. If all the preaching from our Episcopalian pulpits were on as high a doctrinal level as these ecumenical pronouncements, we should have a revived Church. An analysis of our sermons would clearly show that we are lagging behind the ecumenical movement in apprehension of the basic Christian Gospel. Anglo-catholic sermons, in this regard, do not differ very much from the sermons preached by those belonging to other parties. The Catholic cult, of course, is more in evidence, as are the sacraments, but the sermon appeal is usually still to man's own ethical striving. The cult is presented as an extra help in this ethical achievement, and the Protestant is pitied or berated for not possessing this help. There is some truth, of course, in this contention. But the Gospel itself—Judgment and Grace, salvation through faith in Cross and Resurrection, the Church as the fellowship of the forgiven, filled with the power of the Holy

Spirit—these frequently remain vague, beclouded realities, veiled by emphasis upon the cult itself.

The return of Reformation theology in our day can open our eyes to a great danger. If Luther and Calvin are too suspect, let us turn to our own Anglican Church "Fathers" of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. I have been re-reading recently Paul Elmer More's notable compendium of Anglican theology in the handy volume entitled *Anglicanism*. Even a few hours spent with this book can convince the reader that Anglicanism accepted one of the main principles of the Reformation—Holy Scripture as the locus of authority, in place of Pope or tradition. We today can see how this shift failed to solve some very fundamental problems. We can reexamine the Reformation thesis. But Anglicanism shared with the whole Protestant revolt this major assumption. Nor was this a trifling matter. It meant that the Church itself (the Church of history) stood under judgment. The Cult stood under judgment, and so did General Councils and Church Order and the sacramental system. To bind conscience beyond the clear precepts of the Bible was ruled out of court. Anglicanism had not broken with the Church of history, had admitted tradition and had maintained a succession, particularly in the episcopate. But these were no longer absolutes. Anglicanism defended them as permitted, or not forbidden, by Scripture. The criterion for retention was really ecumenical churchmanship, "catholic" churchmanship—a criterion by which they can be defended and retained to this day and woven into the fabric of Church life of the ecumenical Church of the future. The point is, however, that Fundamentalist Catholicism, the Catholicism of the Tractarian movement or of the Anglo-catholic party of recent times, was as yet largely unknown. Anglicanism did not exclude from the Church of God all those who had not accepted these secondary marks of the Church of history.

One or two quotations will have to serve in place of many. The first traces back to Bishop Andrewes and is repeated with approval and an addition by Bishop Bramhall:

"If Episcopacy be of Divine right, it doth not follow from thence that there is no salvation without it, or that a Church cannot consist without it. He is blind who does not see Churches consisting without it; he is hard-hearted who denieth them salvation. We are none of these hard-hearted persons; we put a great difference between these things. There may be something in the exterior regiment, which is of Divine right, and yet salvation to be had."

And John Bramhall adds his comment:

"This mistake procedeth from not distinguishing between the true nature and essence of the Church, which we do readily grant them (non-Episcopalians), and the integrity or perfection of a Church, which we cannot grant them without swerving from the judgment of the Catholic Church." (More, *Anglicanism*, p. 403.)

Hooker is in line with Andrewes and Bramhall when he says:

"Another extraordinary kind of vocation is, when the exigence of necessity doth constrain to leave the usual ways of the Church, which otherwise we would willingly keep; where the Church must needs have some ordained, and neither hath nor can have possibly a Bishop to ordain. In case of such necessity, the ordinary institution of God hath given oftentimes, and may give, place." (*Ecclesiastical Polity*, 7.14.11.)

These pronouncements are noteworthy when we think of the age when they were written—a time when Anglicans and Puritans fought a Civil War!

I have ventured to call the churchmanship of our Anglican Fathers ecumenical churchmanship. Of course, they would not have used the word. They used "catholic" instead. But they accepted its meaning in a non-Fundamentalist sense.

Here, I think, if only we can define it aright, is the issue which divides you and me and which will determine the attitude of every Episcopalian on reunion moves. We divide on whether "Church" means for us that fellowship only which has preserved the polity and sacramental system (granted that Anglicanism itself has done so) of the undivided Church, or whether "Church" includes those who have not preserved this intact. Decide either way and momentous corollaries follow. I doubt, for example, that you would be really willing to follow Bishop Andrewes in his admission that a real "Church" can exist without an episcopally ordained ministry. Its sacraments, at least, would be impugned. So long as you hold this exclusive view, you must logically demand of a reunion movement that it begin with submission on the part of a Protestant communion. Only after it has again become part of the "Church" can honest negotiations take place.

If I understand you aright, it is this acceptance of the Presbyterian Communion as "Church" which underlies all of your opposition to the present proposals for achieving organic union with this body. We treat them as "Church" on an equality with ourselves, however much we may later wrestle with the problem of regularizing both ministries

in one episcopal polity. You cannot deny that episcopacy is accepted by both bodies. You might have considered this literally momentous (as indeed it is), and as satisfying the terms of the Chicago-Lambeth Quadrilateral. But, amazingly enough, you do not accept this as satisfactory. I cannot quite get at your reasons. They apparently do not stem first of all from the irregularities which are going to exist during some intermediate period—though we all want to examine these with care. Your opposition is more basic. You call in the word "faith" and suggest that these proposals for union surrender a vital portion of the Catholic "faith." Pressed for specifications, you do not really mean to impugn the loyalty of the Presbyterians to the Creeds, though you express doubts on this also. But the "faith" which you are most concerned about is correct belief about the Church. Pressed still further, you admit that you really mean a correct belief about the ministry. Sacraments are "valid," you hold, only when administered by a properly empowered priesthood. The Catholic episcopate is the channel of such empowering. The "real presence" of Christ in the eucharist depends upon its "validity," which depends, in turn, upon episcopal ordination. A properly ordained priesthood, further, is the only one possessing the "power of the keys" involved in absolving. A Catholic ministry, according to your view, differs "in kind" from a Protestant ministry. Until this essential distinction is acknowledged, the acceptance of episcopal succession on the part of a Protestant communion is going through a meaningless form. A Protestant body uniting with us must accept this "faith," this doctrine of the ministry, before reunion becomes possible. For on this doctrine of the ministry depends the right doctrine of the Church.

Your doctrine of the Church seems to me to differ very little from that of Rome—Rome with the papacy omitted. And Rome does not hesitate to say bluntly what she means. On the relation of the ministry to the Church an Encyclical of Pope Pius X (*Vehementer*, Feb. 11, 1906) is remarkably explicit:

"The Church is the mystical Body of Christ, a Body ruled by Pastors and Teachers, a society of men headed by rulers having full and perfect powers of governing, instructing and judging. It follows that this Church is essentially an unequal society, that is to say, a society comprising two categories of persons; pastors and the flock; those who hold rank in the different degrees of the hierarchy and the multitude of the faithful; and these categories are so distinct in themselves that in the pastoral body alone reside the necessary right and authority to guide and direct all the members to-

ward the good of the society. As for the multitude, it has no right other than that of allowing itself to be led and, as a docile flock, to follow its shepherds."

This pronouncement uses pastoral metaphors and does not allude to the sacramental powers of the hierarchy. But shift the emphasis a little and is not this very much your doctrine of the Church? One of the best recent books stating the Fundamentalist Catholic view of the ministry is Sparrow Simpson's *The Ministry and the Eucharist*. Whatever else a Church might have without an episcopally ordained priesthood, so it argues, it cannot have the eucharist. Is not this, essentially, your view?

Whenever you and I have landed in this area of debate, we have found ourselves in a wilderness of argument. Here is the unconquered no-man's land of the doctrine of the Church. A whole volume would scarcely suffice to explore all its intricate geography. Here, if anywhere, the battle between two apparently irreconcilable views of the Church is going to be fought out.

As I see it, these two views might be diagrammed. In both we try to picture the flow of spiritual power. In both this is, of course, derived from Christ, Founder and Lord of the Church. Yours would read:

Christ (Holy Spirit) → Ministry → Sacraments → Church

The rival view would picture the line of flow thus:

Christ (Holy Spirit) → Church → Ministry → Sacraments

I unhesitatingly vote for the second of these diagram summaries. As I shall try to show, it can be substantiated by Church history, and can give promise of an ecumenical Church at the same time that it permits full safeguards for the Catholic tradition as regards Church Order.

You will notice that in all discussions regarding the place of the ministry in the Church, the Catholic view tends toward placing two terms in opposition to each other. Since we cannot begin a discussion with a definition of the Church acceptable to both parties, we have to deal with the word pragmatically. If the Catholic view is right, as Pope Pius X voices it, namely, that the ministry leads a life of its own, then a horizontal schism is revealed. Church means ministry. The people, the flock, is read out as really unnecessary. Or conversely, if the Church is thought of as the people, as a social Body whose ministry (every social Body has a ministry) is dependent upon the life of the

Body itself, then a Catholic ministry isolates itself or even excommunicates itself. The Reformation was this latent schism breaking out into the open. It is a great mistake to think that the Reformation churches had no doctrine of the "Church." In a real sense they had a very high doctrine of the Church—so high that the Church as people (the "holy, Christian people of God" as Luther calls them) could be carriers of the powers of the Holy Spirit even without Pope or hierarchy. The Reformation argument was that Pope and traditional hierarchy had read themselves out of the Church.

This all sounds confused—and it is. But in this confusion are rooted the difficulties of reunion. An analogy which you yourself will accept, I think, can make the Reformation view of the Church not altogether absurd. The Protestant looks at the pretensions of the episcopate and priesthood of Catholic apologetic very much as even Anglo-catholics look at the pretensions of the papacy. A functional papacy—one which derives papal power from the Body—any Christian could accept. The present Archbishop of Canterbury is a President of Non-Roman Christendom in embryo now. But when the papacy, in Bishop Frank Weston's words, claims that "there is a residuum of Incarnate Activity that requires an isolated form of expression outside the Body proper" (*The Fullness of Christ*, p. 322), then every non-Roman Christian objects. But, from the Protestant point of view, this is almost precisely what you claim for the episcopally ordained priesthood—"an Incarnational Activity that requires an isolated form of expression outside the Body proper," one which the Body does not possess and on which the Body itself depends. The Protestant protests—and his protest is in the name of the "Church." The Reformation schism was partly along such a horizontal line. Of course, it was not an absolute schism. The pope or the sacramental hierarchy has never been without a flock, nor has there been a Protestant sect without some sort of ministry secured by some form of succession from the hierarchy of the past. Even a Protestant system of doctrine—that of Calvin, for example—can have a high doctrine of the ministry as well as a high doctrine of the Church. It can even lay emphasis on Succession (as do all Presbyterian bodies). Only when the hierarchy lays claim to a stream of power over which the Church (the laity) has no control, which is no longer an *instrument* of the Body, but an autonomous custodian of divine grace—only then does the Reformation revolt make sense.

Logical proofs for an exclusive Catholic view of the episcopate and priesthood can be overwhelming, yet the majority of us are not convinced. We see churches actually existing without them. Perhaps such churches ought not to exist. They ought not to have "spiritually effective" sacraments and ministry. *But they do.* Incarnational activity is simply there. We are admitting the fact in one official document after another (Lambeth, 1920, for example). And to pronounce a ministry "spiritually effective" is to surrender a Fundamentalist claim. For this means that the Holy Spirit dwells in these churches. Hence to assert that these churches cannot have a valid eucharist would be close to blasphemy. Hence, furthermore, the Church, even without a fully regularized hierarchy, simply *must* possess powers not admitted by the logic of Catholicism. The Reformation revealed powers latent in the Church (as over against an autonomous hierarchy) undreamt of before. We cannot quarrel with the God of history. The Presbyterian Church, the Methodist Church, and many another are somehow part of the Universal Church. All reunion movements must start with this hard, sometimes unpalatable admission. We cannot set one baptism over against another baptism as different in kind, nor one eucharist over against another as different in kind, nor one ministry over against another as different in kind. All of these belong functionally to the Church itself and cannot be permanently handed over to a sacerdotal order within the Church which can then monopolize them in an autonomous succession.

The Reformation proved historically the apostasy from the Church of a presumptuous hierarchy. Rome ceased to be the "catholic" Church.

Fundamentalist Catholicism, I would hold, has been disproved by history. Does this mean, however, that the Protestant is in the right in having thrown overboard Catholic Church order itself? I do not think so. Has the Protestant ever objected to Catholic Church order as such? Only rarely. Something must be wrong with Catholic logic, with Catholic apologetic, not with Catholic Church order.

Ecumenical churchmanship cries aloud for a new apologetic for Catholic Church order. Hitherto a Fundamentalist dogmatism has largely monopolized the doctrinal field. Most Catholics have never known any other. Your tenacious adherence to a rigorist view of

Catholic Church order is traceable to a great fear—the fear that if you should yield this dogmatic position, the whole structure of Catholic Church order would fall. You resemble the Bible Fundamentalist in his analogous fear of losing everything the moment he admits that a flaw exists in his literal Bible. And there is some justification in both fears. It has not been easy for modern Biblical scholarship to remain true to the Gospel. It is not going to be easy for a “liberal” Catholicism to be loyal to its inheritance. But both renunciations of Fundamentalist positions build on rediscovered foundations of fact. Contemporary Biblical scholarship is revitalizing the Creed in wonderful ways. None of us, surely, would want to return to the literalism of the eighteenth century. It may turn out that an ecumenical churchmanship can revitalize the Church order of the Catholic centuries as no dogma of an autonomous priesthood or of an infallible Pope has ever done.

An ecumenical defense of the historic Church order of the Catholic centuries—a non-Fundamentalist defense—can it be written? I think it can, and I mean to try. For, clearly, if an ecumenical doctrine of the Church can bring Fundamentalist Catholicism into judgment, Protestantism is brought into judgment also. One merely has to look at the Protestant world, with the Creedal phrase “catholic Church” in mind, to see that something must be radically wrong. The whole ecumenical movement is inspired by repentance for a great sin.

The heresy of Protestantism can, perhaps, be illustrated by a parable—one which reviews the error of Fundamentalist Catholicism also. Luther, in his *Address to the Christian Nobility*, uses this parable and it has become a classic. “If a little company of pious Christian laymen were taken prisoners and carried away to a desert, and had not among them a priest consecrated by a bishop,” could they not, asks Luther, elect one of their number and order him to baptize, to celebrate mass, to absolve, and to preach? These ministerial functions inhere, in the last analysis, in the Church, and the group of laymen is the Church in the desert. The question is hypothetical. The Reformation break-up was more complicated than this. But let us grant Luther his parable and his obvious answer. The history of Christianity since the Reformation has answered his question for him. But press the parable a bit further. The group of exiles are, let us suppose, brought back to civilization. Would they not wish to become one with the Church of

their fathers? Or, if the alienation was originally a revolt, should the very idea of a link with the Church of history have been lost? Or even the idea of organic union with other newly founded churches in the desert? Yet this is the amazing fact in Protestant history. The story is complicated, of course, and analyses of what happened or should have happened abound. But the fact still remains—that the Protestant churches do not add up to the catholic Church. They have lost fellowship with the Church of history. They are only beginning to enjoy fellowship with one another. They are heretics as regards the doctrine of “one, catholic Church.” The ecumenical movement is almost the first sign since the sixteenth century of a reawakened sense of the visible, corporate, organic oneness of the Church.

Of course, there were degrees of revolt among the various “groups of Christian laymen.” The Presbyterian churches retained, surely, a very keen sense of the necessity of a unifying Church order. But an Anglican reading John Calvin can still be amazed at the blindness in this “last of the Church Fathers” regarding the Church as an historical fact. There is for Calvin the Bible, and there is the Church now. The intervening centuries are largely ignored, even though the Church of the early centuries is treated with great respect.

It is certainly a notable fact that with the possible exception of the Church of Sweden, only one of the Reformation churches thought it really important to retain episcopal Church Order—the Anglican Church.

For episcopal Church Order is important. There may indeed be no possibility of a fully catholic church without it. The Reformation churches might surely have secured such succession had they seen its importance. They may come to see this now only through the influence of the ecumenical movement.

To prove such a high claim for the episcopate may not be easy. It may be as difficult for a Protestant to accept the episcopate as it is for a rigorist Catholic to admit a Protestant Church as “Church.”

Yet, if there is any meaning to the word “catholic” in the Creed, this must mean a Church in time as well as in the immediate now. There is a Church of history. There is a Communion of Saints. And if unity is to be maintained in the Church in time as well as in space, some carefully guarded succession must be integral to Church order. An apologetic for some unifying Church order is already being written

the moment the Christian community accepts an ecumenical doctrine of the Church—the Church as *one* Church.

The Protestant churches particularly will be forced to an ecumenical theology or disappear. Religion demands an absolute somewhere. The Protestant thought he had it in the Bible. But has he? There is, of course, an absolute in God's revelation in history—the mighty acts of God recorded in Holy Scripture, summarized later by the Christian community in the Creeds. There is a *once for all* written over these events.

But the moment we go beyond the mighty acts themselves, we enter the world of relativities, the world of the historically contingent. Modern biblical scholarship has shown plainly that the record of the events—the Bible—is no longer an absolute. The Protestantism of the twentieth century, as it returns to the Bible, can no longer deal with it quite as did the Reformation. The Bible remains a "token" (as Barth calls it) of an absolute.

Yet the Church, the Body of Christ, is part of that absolute. Pentecost was one of the mighty acts. The covenant of Grace through Christ Jesus enters into history. A *community* becomes the carrier of the new relationship between man and God. This community writes the record of its own founding and of the divine acts preceding or accompanying that founding. The community is, in that sense, responsible *for* the Book. At the same time, the community remains responsible *to* the Book—the record of a revelation which must stand in judgment over the community. If ever the community emancipates itself and becomes its own judge, a protest in the name of the Book is justified. The Reformation recall to the Bible is not to be dismissed lightly. The Church, too, can err. The community must remain a repenting fellowship. Here Anglicanism is "reformed." The nineteenth Article of Religion puts this quite bluntly: "As the Church of Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Antioch have erred; so also the Church of Rome hath erred, not only in their living and manner of ceremonies, but also in matters of faith."

The question of authority as between Church and Bible has vexed Christianity now for four hundred years. Yet need it be doctrinally insoluble? The Church is part of the Gospel. Its founding is one of God's mighty acts—a *once for all*. But as it develops in history, with a Church order, with a sacramental system, with creeds and a theology,

it enters the contingent, the human, the sinful. To take any one of these developments, at any period, even an early one, and to say that this belongs to the *once for all* of Revelation is presumption. To say that episcopal Church order is dogma is approaching idolatry. The development of the mediaeval papacy is, historically considered, understandable and may have been the will of God. But to raise this historically contingent development to the level of an absolute, a *once for all*, led to a revolt in the name of Revelation itself.

Nevertheless, the Church is still part of the Gospel. The Church—not the Book—remains in history as the carrier of the Incarnate activity of God in time. And this fellowship of the covenant, historically contingent though it be, and remaining under judgment, is the Body of Christ. It is a living Body, living in history and time, and has a spirit—the Holy Spirit. No contact with Christ is possible except through the Holy Spirit dwelling in the Church. Mystical contact with the Jesus of history outside the Church is a delusion. “We know him after the flesh no more.” Contact with Christ merely through the Book is impossible also—or meaningless.

Furthermore, this community of the covenant is one. It is a catholic Church, or else it sins against the covenant and becomes a contradiction in terms. This catholicity must be one of time as well as space. It must remain one through history. To deny the importance of succession in the life of the Church is to deny the importance of its oneness.

Nor has the Church lost its oneness completely. Not a single sect in Christendom has wholly lost its physical connection with the one Body of Christ. Some organic, yes, even physical, connection must exist, or else the very word “community” would not make sense. There may be an invisible Church, but not in human history. And in history something visible has always constituted the basis of oneness. Succession has been by way of the physical—always. Baptism is a physical sacrament and continues a succession. The laying on of hands, if it could be traced, would have an amazing history—a sacrament of touch going back to the Lord Christ himself! Most, if not all, of the Protestant communions possess a hierachical succession which, if really traceable, might be surprising. If episcopal ordination should be taken literally as conferring orders magically and despite full ac-

ceptance of intention, most Protestant ministries would find an episcopal succession hidden in the background, unrecognized.

The Protestant churches have preserved a connection with the Church of history despite themselves. They did not value it either in doctrine or in practice. Frequently it has hung by a thin thread. Submission to the Book seemed, at the moment, far more important. This meant a break first with the mediaeval Church. But it did not stop there. Schism became itself an outward and visible symbol of obedience to Holy Scripture. The oftener such obedience could be symbolized the better. The Bible, a criterion of judgment for the Church, became a substitute for the Church. Church politics proliferated—mostly antiquarian Church politics going back to the Bible. (An Orthodox scholar calls them “romantic, pseudo-historical reconstructions.” See Dunkerley, *The Ministry and The Sacraments*, p. 112.)

But submission to the Book implies a Church which can submit. The Bible demands “one holy catholic Church.” Schism, in the name of the Bible, is a contradiction of the Bible itself. The Bible does not legislate an absolute form for this “one” Church. The form must be found in the relativities of history. Rome erred by refusing to admit that this form is relative and not absolute. Protestantism erred in refusing to admit that it is essential.

Nevertheless, remnants of catholicity are, as already asserted, left in Protestantism—despite itself. Otherwise the ecumenical movement would be an absurdity, or any debate about orders or validity of sacraments. Only this catholicity is on a low level of organic structure. Belief in the importance of the organic structure must reappear—belief in the catholic Church as carrier of the covenant through history, belief in the oneness of the Body. This implies Church order—a catholic Church order. This implies, furthermore a Church order linking the Church of the present with the Church of history and of time.

What a pity it is that the Reformation, revolting against the dogmatic presumption of mediaeval Church order overthrew that order itself! Everywhere, that is, except in Sweden and in England. For consider the Church of history, and episcopal Church order takes on almost gigantic proportions. Let us grant that it cannot be made dogma as can the *once for all* recorded in Holy Scripture. Let us grant that it is not, as a *form*, of the *esse* of the Church. It is not synonymous with the covenant of God's grace of the New Testament. Let us grant

that even historically apostolic succession cannot be proved, nor a "theory of Transmission" found in the early Church such as became dogma in the Roman Church. Let us cling only to the ecumenical faith of Christianity in "one holy, catholic, and apostolic Church." This is enough. Episcopal Church order needs for an apologetic merely an acceptance of the evangelical, Biblical faith in the "fellowship of the mystery."

For this fellowship in Christ must surely be a fellowship in time as well as in the immediate *now*. It must include the Communion of saints of history. It cannot read out of the Church the first fifteen hundred years of the Church in time. "Why," asks P. T. Forsyth of modern Congregationalists, "has the authority of the Church sunk to the rude political arbitrament of a living majority, when the real spiritual majority are the dead?" (*The Principle of Authority*, p. 11.) The blindness to this seemingly obvious fact in Protestant confessions of faith is to a "Catholic" more than a little amazing. The Presbyterian formulary defines the catholic Church as follows: "The universal Church consists of all persons, in every nation, together with their children, who make profession of the holy religion of Christ, and of submission to his laws." (*Form of Government*, Ch. II.) True enough, so far as it goes, but where is the Church of history? Calvin is, no doubt, partly justified in his puncturing of a presumptuous faith in mere hierarchical succession: "In regard to the government of the Church, nothing can be more frivolous than to place the succession in the persons, to the neglect of the doctrine." (*Institutes*, 4.5.) The Church of history, we grant, does stand under the judgment of the Word. But even the Word cannot transmit itself through time except by way of persons, by way of a succession of persons. The Bible cannot live in a vacuum. It, too, has to be guarded as it is handed from generation to generation. It cannot live without the Church.

"I believe in the holy Catholic Church; the Communion of Saints." Is it not an observable fact that these phrases of the Creed mean for a Catholic what they cannot mean for a Protestant? He has communion fellowship with the Church of the ages.

I still recall as if it were yesterday my first contact with this "Church of the ages." As a youthful organist of seventeen I was asked to serve in an Episcopal Church. Brought up in an evangelical Men-

nonite parsonage, I knew the Church in its evangelical form intimately. Certain marks of the Church of the New Testament I have never seen better exemplified than in this Protestant sect of my fathers—personal devoutness and communal charity, the dignity and liberty of the Christian man, the "Church meeting" exercising the awe-inspiring priestly power of absolution and restoration to fellowship. The Holy Supper, guarded against profanation by communal disciplines of repentance, was a majestic experience. Yet my first service in an Episcopal Church opened a whole new world. Here was The Church of history—not an autonomous, isolated flock, however devout. Here were prayers and a liturgy not springing up out of the immediate now, voiced by a minister subject to no control except loyalty to an ancient Book. The prayers, instead, were those of a long Communion of saints, hallowed by time, passed under the judgment of countless generations. Here was a Communion service ushering me into a fellowship far transcending the bounds of a single congregation. The immediate flock was small and comparatively insignificant in our western town with its imposing rival Protestant churches. Yet this, somehow, did not matter. The Church of history could counterbalance, even in numbers, such pretensions of size. Here, furthermore, symbolic links with the long past of the Christian fellowship abounded—in vestments, in ritual acts, in the traditional prayers. Links with the Church of the ages could undoubtedly be found in the Protestant churches round about. But here these were self-conscious. They were dealt with as important. The chief living symbol of the continuity of the Church was, of course, the Bishop. No Anglican or Catholic layman puzzles himself very much with theories of apostolic succession. He does not need to. He knows without much argument that he would not have contact with the Church of history unless some one had preserved continuity and fellowship. The episcopate as guardian of such continuity is accepted as an almost obvious answer to a need.

And, surely, the ecumenical movement as it captures the imagination of Protestant bodies, must stumble upon the obvious implication of ecumenism—a universal fellowship of Christians in time as well as in the now. Gather all of Protestantism into one organic unity, and you would not yet have the catholic church. The majority in the Communion of saints are the dead. We do not need to make episcopal Church order dogma to prove that it is, in the realm of historical rela-

tivities, necessary. Indeed, it won't win out if we do make it dogmatically of the *esse* of the Church. No Protestant will deny to his communion the name of Church, nor admit that his ministry and his sacraments are invalid. The problem is: Ministry recognized by whom? Sacraments valid for whom? The Church is "one Church"—"in fragments." No ministry universally recognized by the whole Church exists. No sacraments pragmatically valid throughout the Church exist.

The reunion of Christendom is going to require a great venture of faith—faith in the Church of God itself. That Church is still God's Church and His Holy Spirit has not departed from it. His Holy Spirit still dwells in Congregationalist meetings and Presbyterian judicatories and Lambeth conferences of Bishops. But that Spirit is crying for a single Body, for incarnation in a Church order which can give Christ authority in history once more and hands and feet for united action.

To secure organic union we shall have to accept a paradox. Protestant bodies are part of the Catholic Church. They are at the same time not the Catholic Church. We shall have to accept the doctrine of the Church of both the Congregationalist and the Anglican—two extremes in Church order.

J. S. Whale puts the Congregationalist faith as follows:

"To Congregationalists the question, What constitutes a valid Eucharist? is meaningless as it stands. 'Validity' and 'invalidity' are most improper terms to use here. The Sacraments are God's action. God—if He be acting at all—cannot be acting invalidly or irregularly. If God be not acting in a Church there is no action, for the Church has no meaning whatsoever as a human society apart from God's action. An 'invalid' Eucharist would be as incredible, therefore, as the suggestion that, during four hundred years, sons of Geneva have never really celebrated the Lord's Supper." (Dunkerley, *The Ministry and The Sacraments*, p. 218.)

That is hard for a Catholic to take. I see no way of avoiding its ultimate truth, however, even though logic might play differently with the word "valid." Yet God must be used to paradoxes, and the Church can only submit.

But the Protestant can, in turn, be asked to yield to catholic Church order. No plea addressed to our age for this order has ever been more persuasively set forth than in the Lambeth "Appeal to all Christian People." (The reader will note that in this the words "valid" and "invalid" do not appear.) After defining the crying need for a

"ministry acknowledged by every part of the Church," the Appeal proceeds:

"May we not reasonably claim that the Episcopate is the one means of providing such a ministry? It is not that we call in question for a moment the spiritual reality of the ministries of those Communion which do not possess the Episcopate. On the contrary, we thankfully acknowledge that these ministries have been manifestly blessed and owned by the Holy Spirit as effective means of grace. But we submit that considerations alike of history and of present experience justify the claim which we make on behalf of the Episcopate. Moreover, we would urge that it is now and will prove to be in the future the best instrument for maintaining the unity and continuity of the Church. But we greatly desire that the office of a Bishop should be everywhere exercised in a representative and constitutional manner, and more truly express all that ought to be involved for the life of the Christian Family in the title of Father-in-God. Nay more, we eagerly look forward to the day when through its acceptance in a united Church we may all share in that grace which is pledged to the members of the whole body in the apostolic rite of the laying-on of hands, and in the joy and fellowship of a Eucharist in which as one Family we may together, without any doubtfulness of mind, offer to the one Lord our worship and service.

"We believe that for all the truly equitable approach to union is by the way of mutual deference to one another's consciences. To this end, we who send forth this appeal would say that if the authorities of other Communion should so desire, we are persuaded that, terms of union having been otherwise satisfactorily adjusted, Bishops and clergy of our Communion would willingly accept from these authorities a form of commission or recognition which would commend our ministry to their congregations, as having its place in the one family life. It is not in our power to know how far this suggestion may be acceptable to those to whom we offer it. We can only say that we offer it in all sincerity as a token of our longing that all ministries of grace, theirs and ours, shall be available for the service of our Lord in a united Church.

"It is our hope that the same motive would lead ministers who have not received it to accept a commission through episcopal ordination, as obtaining for them a ministry throughout the whole fellowship.

"In so acting no one of us could possibly be taken to repudiate his past ministry. God forbid that any man should repudiate a past experience rich in spiritual blessings for himself and others. Nor would any of us be dishonouring the Holy Spirit of God, whose call led us all to our several ministries, and whose power enabled us to perform them. We shall be publicly and formally seeking additional recognition of a new call to wider service in a reunited Church, and imploring for ourselves God's grace and strength to fulfil the same.

"The spiritual leadership of the Catholic Church in days to come, for which the world is manifestly waiting, depends upon the readiness with which each group is prepared to make sacrifices for the sake of a common fellowship, a common ministry, and a common service to the world.

"We place this ideal first and foremost before ourselves and our own people. We call upon them to make the effort to meet the demands of a new age with a new outlook. To all other Christian people whom our words may reach we make the same appeal. We do not ask that any one Communion should consent to be absorbed in another. We do ask that all should unite in a new and great endeavour to recover and to manifest to the world the unity of the Body of Christ for which He prayed."

I come at long last to the considerations of the proposals for union between the Episcopal and Presbyterian churches. Do these, as you examine them candidly, go very much beyond the Lambeth "Appeal"? Some details in the "Basic Principles" I, too, do not like. Much conferring will still have to take place before canon law acceptable to both churches can be written. But the big thing is there—episcopal Church order. Even if the terms of reunion contained more irregularities than the present proposals, no one could dispute that this greatest of hurdles to a reunited Church is accepted.

Why, then, are you, as an Anglo-Catholic, so doubtful of these proposals? If your opposition rests upon the avoidance of Fundamentalist ecclesiological dogma, I have spoken my mind already. On this issue I think you are wrong—as my long argument pleads. I must leave it as it is, remarking only that Anglicanism, historically speaking, is, I feel sure, not Fundamentalist in its ecclesiological doctrine. Rigorist Anglo-catholicism is, on this issue, departing from our own tradition.

Another difficulty with the present proposals, however, I, too, am prepared to take seriously. We are proposing to unite with a Protestant communion which is plainly not ready to see or to accept all the implications of episcopal Church order. Their communion is not in the tradition of the Prayer Book, nor of the historic liturgical life which is, we feel, almost an inseparable expression of our Church order. Are we not, therefore, playing magic with the episcopate, even though we might present an apologetic for it on historic rather than dogmatic grounds? What hope is there of making it mean for them what it means for us—the organ of continuity with the Church in time, the organ of unity within the Catholic Church?

The only reply I can give to this fear is the answer of faith—faith in episcopal Church order itself. If episcopal Church order is what we claim for it, this will have to perform, under God, its own work. A Presbyterian evangelical minister will be in the same Church order with a monk of one of our religious communities, and with a high-church rector celebrating "mass" in mediaeval vestments. Something is bound to happen. Fundamentalist Catholicism will not survive, I grant you. But Protestant individualism won't survive either.

Furthermore, one of the great principles of Catholic experience comes to our aid. The Catholic trusts sacramental grace. He knows that the physical can be the vehicle of the spiritual. He knows also that

the physical always precedes the spiritual. A child is baptised before it appropriates its inheritance as a child of God. A sacrament is trusted to perform its task, God standing ready to make it effective. An ecumenical Church order, similarly, may have to validate itself experientially. It cannot be fully taught and apprehended beforehand as can an article of doctrine. It is a living thing. We shall have to be "born again," both we and the Presbyterians. Only then will we know what "union" really means. We shall have to trust God.

THE DIFFICULTY WITH DEMOCRACY

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The question has sometimes been asked: Had Shakespeare, in writing *The Tempest*, any political motive? Is the description of Gonzalo's Commonwealth, borrowed of course from Montaigne, anything more than the poet's speculation as to what perchance was like the life of those recently discovered peoples in the Western Seas? It is perhaps worth while to quote the passage:

"Had I the plantation of this isle, my Lord,
And were the king on't, what would I do?
I' the Commonwealth I would by contraries
Execute all things: for no kind of traffic
Would I admit; no name of magistrate;
Letters should not be known; riches, poverty,
And use of service none; contract, succession,
Bourn, bound of land, tilth, vineyard, none;
No use of metal, corn, or wine, or oil;
No occupation; all men idle, all;
And women too—but innocent and pure;
No sovereignty;—" (Act II, Scene 1).

One must of course be chary of finding Shakespeare's political opinions in the utterances of his characters, or even in the plots of his dramas. Nevertheless, it does seem legitimate, without committing the poet too definitely to one particular side in a discussion, to find in *The Tempest* the starting-point for some amount of political disquisition. Shakespeare himself is always more concerned with the stating of problems than with their solution; but in his posing of the problem he is inevitably the realist.

This realism, in the case of *The Tempest*, involves the presentation of three very diverse characters. First there is *Prospero*, the exiled aristocrat, a benevolent despot even in his exile. Such a despot is frequently a highly desirable member of the community, especially if you can make sure of his benevolence. In the second place we have *Ariel*, in whom we may discern the qualities of imagination. This too must

be recognised as an important element in any potentially successful system of government. Even though Ariel appear to some a little flighty, experience will vindicate his claim to possess a considerable degree of practical usefulness. Then, in the third place, we have *Caliban*, the representative of the common man, *Demos*, man in the mass, as far removed from the ideal embodied in Prospero as from that depicted by Ariel. He is also, be it noted, very far removed from those vulgar products of so-called civilization, Trinculo and Stephano.

Probably not much sympathy has been lavished on the Caliban of Shakespeare's play, yet sympathy is certainly his due, even when we fight him for his churlishness and scold him for his stupidity. We may easily disguise our fellow-feeling when he goes on strike and sings: 'No more dams I'll make for fish,' a slogan which is at once the 'Marseillaise' of his independence and the college yell of his C.I.O. But there is more in Caliban than appears in his rôle as a revolutionist. Naturally he is a creature of physical appetites. Almost his first words: 'I want my dinner' suggest this, although we may well remind ourselves that the petition: 'Give us this day our daily bread' is still in the very heart of Christian prayer. But Caliban has in addition a sincere love of nature. He knows "the qualities of the isle." He reveals himself in his speech as a true poet. An undeveloped being, he is much concerned with his reactions to physical pain and physical power and is easily cajoled into rebellion against one master, although the revolt may be but the prelude to a severer servitude. In short, he is primitive, not degenerate, undeveloped, not undevelopable, uneducated, not uneducable.

But before we attempt to make what is said above the starting-point for a more or less objective discussion of democracy it may be helpful to note that two other great writers, in addition to Shakespeare, have made of Caliban the subject of anthropological speculation.

The first of these is the French writer Ernest Renan, who has given us the drama *Caliban*. In this highly significant work we see Prospero abandoning the cares of government and absorbed exclusively in the effort to discover the *Elixir Vitae*. He has, in fact, as so many other aristocrats have done, forfeited the right to rule by indifference to the duty of ruling well. On the other hand, we have a Caliban who has learned much about the rights of man in the abstract and conceives these to be absolute. He is disgusted, moreover, with what he calls

"the eternal mandolinade" of Ariel. It is not surprising therefore that, under circumstances which remind us not a little of those which brought about the Revolution in France, an outbreak occurs. Prospero, unlike the French monarch, surrenders unreluctantly the responsibilities of government to continue his scientific researches. Through these, with the aid of Ariel, he attains to a vision of the future. In this vision he beholds the gods of the coming era under the rule of Caliban. They appear as giants of polished steel, with enormous legs and thighs, mechanically articulated. Beneath the steel framework there is for each an incandescent tube which serves for a soul. The gods of steel bruise the gods of flesh. War is declared on the things of the spirit, including books. So Ariel, "the damned flute-player," vanishes from the world of men into the world of nature, to flourish with the rose and to be green with the myrtle.

Before passing to our third illustration let me diverge for a moment to point out the similarity between Renan's vision of the coming man and the picture drawn by the Czecho-Slovak poet, Kapek, in the play *Rossum's Universal Robots*. Here again we are confronted with the idea of an industrialised 'civilization' after the pattern of what is called 'efficiency.' But it is an efficiency which is achieved so completely at the expense of the freedom of the soul that mechanical men are supplied in quantities, turned out from the factories according to a formula. Factory-made men are of course not bothered about things like poetry, or art, or music. Talk to them of the *Ten Commandments* and they will gaze at you with a vacant stare. Men do not die; they are simply used up and scrapped. It seems plain that human nature by itself has become too complicated for the ends contemplated by the advocates of pure efficiency. An engineer might surely make men more simply, and much more economically, if he set himself merely to meet industrial requirements. Man had gone off the proper track of his development by wanting to do so many unnecessary things. In consequence the 'New Order' must take care to leave no place for a soul. Yet Kapek, after all, was not thorough-going enough in his doctrine of materialistic pessimism. An error on the part of his efficiency engineer caused the Robots to become just sufficiently human to revolt and in the ensuing revolution humanity is well-nigh swept away in one appalling catastrophe. But one gleam of hope survives, since two of the Robots, having learned to suffer, learn also to love.

So we pass to my third illustration to discover the treasure at the bottom of the Pandora's box where it has been placed in a setting of the entire story of human evolution. It is thus we are enabled to envisage what I desire to present as the Christian doctrine of democracy. The illustration I have in mind is to be found in Browning's famous and familiar poem, *Caliban upon Setebos*, a profound psychological study, invaluable to every student of anthropology and history. The poet, after his manner, reveals the essential optimism of his attitude by showing human nature at its lowest in order to suggest the possibility of the highest. In Caliban, lying on his belly in the cool slush, we see man holding on to the thin tradition he has inherited from his dam, Sycorax. We see him, the incipient theologian, employing the inevitable anthropomorphisms which must in time carry mankind to the highest possible conceptions of deity. We see him, the embryonic philosopher, venturing his aetiological guesses in order to create for himself and his posterity an intelligible cosmogony. We see him, again, hinting at social and religious needs such as shall in time shape themselves into the institutions and rituals in a fully developed religion. It is clear that, as in the old Miracle Play we have the character 'Adam on his way to be born,' so here we have man at the start of that long, triumphant march which, after ages of discipline, shall bring him to the measure of the stature of his proper destiny.

We have, then, three pictures of mankind; first, with Shakespeare, the man of the realist, a mankind which might well be considered static were there no such thing as the evolutionary process. Stemming from such a view we have, in the first place, the Caliban of Renan, man on the road chosen by himself for himself alone, and marked out by the limitations of a materialistic philosophy. We see him, in other words, on the mud-sills of an animal inheritance, totally divorced from any dream of a divine purpose, in him or for him. The interpolation is hardly necessary that such a result of the travail of the millenniums would falsify any intuition of a "far-off, divine event" that man has ever entertained. Creation would end for us in an intellectual *débâcle* such as must shatter the very idea of a rational universe. And incidentally it must make of anything we can call democracy the vainest of delusions. We should have a humanity just rational enough to resent the sitting aloft of an Arch-mocker who awaits the moment of his caprice to smash to atoms his painfully concocted toy. Poor Pros-

pero, we may reflect, talking like a fool of his magic! Poor Miranda, deluding herself with roseate dreams, yet ultimately the inevitable prey of the brute! Poor Ariel, driven, like the sinner in the *Inferno*, back into the vegetable world! Nor less pitiable, poor Caliban, with his music muted, his poetry quenched, tempted by the chances of power to play the tyrant in matters wherein he has as yet barely learned to serve!

It is over against these two pictures we place that created by the spiritual vision of Browning, a vision in which Caliban is seen as neither static nor inevitably degenerate, but a true man growing up to the understanding of his proper faculties (faculties implanted by an all-wise Creator), and learning to base his relations with his fellow-men upon a felt relationship to God Himself. It is from this point that Christians begin to understand what democracy really is and what inevitable difficulties lie in the path of its successful working as a form of government.

But, first, of all, let us ask ourselves: What is democracy and what is it not? Language is often so loosely used and clichés so often usurp the authority of axioms that it is well to pause a moment at this point. Occasionally even the most conspicuous of our political guides are in this respect the most conspicuous of sinners. For example, no supposed definition has been more frequently cited than that which Abraham Lincoln (in his famous Gettysburg address) borrowed from the speeches of Richard Brinsley Sheridan: "Government of the people, by the people, for the people," yet we have here but a definition shorn of its proper cosmic basis. Far more misleadingly vague is our present President who is constantly talking about our 'sister democracies' without any attempt at definition whatsoever. In such talk he invariably includes the twenty-one South American governments, of which fourteen are military dictatorships, and the Chungking government of western China which has never been anything else but the rule of a war-lord. And now that Josef Stalin has put on sheeps' clothing and learned to say, thank God for American aid, the Soviets may likewise be gathered into the fold of the democracies and Russia once again be described as Holy Russia. It is a common impression that because the word *democracy* is Greek Greece must certainly be a democracy. Nothing could be further from the truth, either in past or present times. In ancient Greece the freedom of a few rested upon the shoulders of a huge mass of slave labor. The democracy of Greece

has been aptly described as "a singularly close and oppressive form of oligarchy." Herodotus well said: "To save ourselves from the insolence of a despot by changing it for the insolence of the unbridled community, that were unbearable indeed." It is therefore exceedingly important that we avoid the common error of describing the governments we like as democracies and labelling the others as dictatorships. It is along such a road we proceed to fulfil the prophecy of Huey Long that when this country adopts fascism we will call it anti-facism.

What then must be the basis for the kind of democracy in which justice is assured for each and all and citizens made for ever secure against the injustice of tyranny or caprice? Many theories have been propounded, all the way from a doctrine of natural right, or social contract, or property qualification, or educational standard, to the popularly accepted idea of crude majority rule, something perhaps to be most easily discovered through the mechanism of a Gallup's poll. It has apparently occurred to but a few that, as in the case of so many other things, the truth about democracy is only discoverable in what appears to be a contradiction, namely, in the acceptance of that philosophy of paradox, such as involves the reconciliation of opposites rather than the adoption of the middle path. This rather than logic (which has in history proved the atmosphere favorable to heresy) in most cases must furnish our surest approach to truth. It is in essence the Hegelian sequence of *thesis*, *antithesis* and *synthesis*.

Now the first term of this paradox is of course to be found in what the theologian will describe as the supreme will of God, that faith in a moral law which is as imperative in its incidence as any generally recognised law of the physical world. It is the recognition of a principle, implicit in every religious philosophy from the beginning of time—the *Rita* of India, the *Arta* of Persia, the *Moirai* of Greece, and the *Fatum* of Rome, the force to which gods and men alike must bow. And, complementary to this, equally of course, comes the recognition of the freedom of the individual to be captain of his soul and master of his fate. Each of these principles must be intellectually postulated, though each by itself is not only incomplete but potentially mischievous. The two together imply that synthesis of the doctrines of the divine transcendence and the divine immanence in one fact which, in theological language we speak of as the doctrine of the Incarnation. In this fact we have a synthesis which is like that correlation of the cen-

tripetal and centrifugal forces which keeps the planets in their orbits around the sun.

It must be confessed that our political thought has seldom achieved the reconciliation of these apparently opposite principles. In the early days of our Republic the fundamental fear of God, inherited and brought over by the Pilgrim Fathers was predominately of that hard, Calvinistic type in which the decrees of God were believed to determine for all eternity the destiny of the individual. Had this been generally accepted, from an entirely different point of view than that of Renan's Caliban, all free men would have inescapably become robots. That this was not so to any greater extent is proof that there were in the early days of the Republic men of indomitable courage who were ready to "fight the decrees." But it is nevertheless clear that for very many life was turned into a kind of steel trap from which not even death provided a way of escape.

The natural reaction from this kind of determinism was in the direction of a passionate Jeffersonian type of democracy which was strongly accented by an agnostic and materialistic following of the teachings of Tom Paine. This carried men dangerously away from the Charybdis of Calvinism towards the Scylla of a philosophy such as dispensed altogether with the traditional respect for the will of God. In course of time the result appeared in a broken synthesis which, of course, has been still further shattered by a generally accepted system of secular education—itsself largely due to sectarian differences in matters which were seldom fundamental and for which professedly Christian people must in the main be considered responsible. Thus has come into vogue a conception of democracy founded on nothing more substantial than the changing opinions of a plebiscite, a foundation as undependable as the mountain of Hindu cosmogony which was built upon the back of a tortoise in the void.

Naturally, as already hinted, the only enduring solution of our problem must be found in the synthesis by which man envisages at one and the same moment his own human unity and the Fatherhood of God. The doctrine of divine authority by itself would only lead to the political absolutism of Hobbes; the doctrine of human freedom by itself would only lead to the anarchy of the early days of the French Revolution. But, as there can be no true patriotism where men hold an idolatrous view of the State, so there can be no true doctrine of the

State which is not based on the vision of 'the city not made with hands,' 'the city built to music and therefore never built at all and therefore built for ever.'—"I say not, Dear City of Cecrops, but Dear City of God." The universe is a circle in which the radii can only find their unity at the centre and can only get nearer to one another as they approach that centre. It is only in the worship of the "sweet will of God" (to use the language of the mystics) that men may find those social accords, communal, national, or international, whereby peace may be attracted to bless this troubled earth. In other words, it is the ideal City of God alone which can afford a sanction and provide a goal for the society of men. The ethical foundation of society can only rest upon a sense of duty which itself rests upon faith in a relationship with the supreme author of the universe.

Just as soon as we perceive the necessity for such a synthesis as I have described the idea of democracy is in its full significance made clear. It is no longer conceived as a static thing, but a trend and a process—a process, moreover, conditioned not only by time but by moral effort. The success and the speed of this process are determined by our conviction as to the educability of man and by the extent of our co-operation with the supreme will in perfecting the pattern which we have learned to accept as the goal of our evolution. It is one thing to invoke the machinery of government in order that the bottom-most strata of human intelligence may become the determining factor in the organising and enforcement of a political system; it is quite another thing so to train human intelligence, in the light of accepted Christian principles, as to make that intelligence part and parcel of the divine order, to make out of it, with all its immaturity and weakness, what the poet describes as "the strong arm-fellow of God."

Hence two things remain to be noted which are particularly germane to our discussion; first, the all-too-evident manifestation of a one-sided conception of democracy such as dispenses altogether with respect for the sovereign will of God; and, secondly, the growing need (not least among professedly Christian people) that men approach the entire subject from the religious rather than from the merely political point of view. To keep our political science and our religious philosophy in separate water-tight compartments is to invite disaster in the realm of each.

First, as to some signs of the times which seem to show departure from the first faith of the fathers of the Republic, though, of course, few Americans would at any time claim that our democracy is a finished business. Even in the years not so far removed from the beginning of our national history a few prophetic souls were visited by doubts as to the ultimate issue of trends which they themselves observed. For example, we find Henry Adams, in his novel *Democracy*, satirising the materialistic, one-sided thought which attaches importance to numbers and quantity, "that liberalism of low passions" which "sets the quality of men at nought." One character in the story declares "democracy shakes my nerves to pieces" and he longs "for the Pyramids and the Polar Star." Two generations ago, again, Matthew Arnold, in his first great lecture delivered in this country, entitled *Numbers*, commented scathingly on the disposition to megalomania and warned against an ultimate loss of privilege through our unwillingness to accept the discipline of life. Still more recently a visitor has asked of us the question: "How is it that contemporary America affords so staggering an example of communal ignorance and social tyranny combined with a mania for framing laws which either provoke derision or are partially enforced under conditions of patent corruption and oppression?" Yet the vast majority of people, then and now, have seemed content to live in the mental condition of the French monarch who, in the most exciting days of the French Revolution, wrote in his diary day after day the one word *Rien* (*Nothing*) as the sole record of the day's events.

It is not necessary to quote elaborate statistics. The general trend of our democracy in recent years is all too plainly charted. Is it nothing that, while the population of the United States has for a certain period increased 111%, the number of insane has advanced by 469%? Is it nothing that to-day in the United States "murder is one of the safest occupations," or that, according to the figures compiled by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, for one year, for every 145 murders there are 69 indictments, 37 sentences, and one execution? One might multiply such illustrations indefinitely. Privilege, it must be remembered, descends like the rain on a watershed, and the results flow, on the one hand "to the dark and frozen tide" and, on the other, "to the peaceful sea." This is indeed the inescapable condition on which we receive even the gift of life itself. The gift heals us or it

hurts us. And the greater the gift the greater the necessity for character that we may use the gift aright. If we are given wings, we must pay for wings, as the flying-fish does, by the doubling of our dangers.

Of course the good democrat may always fall back upon his belief that democracy is educable and is being educated by its mistakes. I heard Dr. David Starr Jordan maintain this in the University of Washington more than forty years ago. Had we but clear evidence that this is generally the case there might be less misgiving and the less need to pray for patience. But it seems plain that a democracy built on what I have called the mud-sills of a humanity divorced from a belief in God is in no such line of evolution as includes within it the promise of perfectibility. Theoretically it might just as well produce the economy of an ant-hill as that of Dante's *White Rose of Paradise*. A humanity endeavoring to raise itself by its own bootstraps has little to suggest the prospect of the god-like. When T. H. Huxley was asked to recommend the positivist system of Auguste Comte he replied that he would just as soon recommend the worship of an anthropoid ape as make a deity of man as man is commonly understood. The demagogue who beholds in *Vox populi* the *Vox Dei* is just as far from the truth as the Nazi who recognises it in the decrees of the Führer. A system of inverted oligarchy such as concedes the claim of the ignorant to order the life of the intelligent, the claim of the weak to regulate the life of the strong, and the right of the less fit to furnish a standard of life for the more fit, is not democracy but a base form of tyranny. In such a case we have once again Sir Lancelot of the Lake beaten down by 'the mean knights.'

The saddest part of it all is that this King Caliban is no 'trumped-up king,' no 'King Pétaud.' Already he has provided for his subjects straight-jackets of a rather rigid sort. Grovelling samenesses are the courtiers at his feet. To the gendarmerie who guard his palaces greatness is the bull in the china-shop. The sun of his rule rises only on a realm of shabby mediocrities.

Lest this should seem a piece of vague and pessimistic generalization I might speak more definitely with regard to some of the departments of life in which the undeveloped Caliban is unquestionably king. We might find more than a few illustrations in the realms of politics and legislation, with all their slovenly wastefulness of democratic proc-

esses of government as these are generally understood. In this connection someone has rather pertinently remarked that at the present rate of expenditure it will not be long before the machinery of government is found to be absorbing the entire revenue of the State. There are many other departments of our so-called 'American way of life' which in equal measure serve to show up the weak spots of our conception of democracy. Not to mention the large literature of misinformation in the realm of journalism, both negatively by omission and positively by misstatement, the auxiliaries of our free press, such as the radio and the moving-picture, provide for the dissemination of a flood of untruth which the conscientious historian will never be able to stem and from which the salvaging of facts may never be possible. And all this without overmuch protest from a gullible public. An English writer has said, without too much exaggeration: "To read an American newspaper is a ghastly experience." I had well-nigh included the pulpit in my indictment, but I take it for granted that most preachers are well aware of the feebleness of their efforts to make use of the magnificent mission whereby is to be made manifest that "mightiest realm of God in man," the Kingdom of Christ.

It should be of some constructive value to ask in conclusion; What can we do to make democracy a force rather than a farce? The first thing, of course, is to show in our public as well as in our private life, in our schools and in our universities, our conferences and our forums, that we accept democracy as resting only on the solid bed-rock of belief in a moral universe, a universe of which we are a part and in which we all alike have the responsibility of co-operating. As already suggested, the brotherhood of man can only be postulated when it is recognised as involved in the doctrine of the unity of God. The saddle maker and Alcibiades are only included in one category when seen to be alike members of one household which is at the same time a theocracy and a democracy. The steady and abiding will to render to each man that measure of justice which is his due can only exist as each man, even the least and the lowest, is held to be akin to the highest and partner to the best.

Secondly, a belief in democracy can only survive in proportion as we perceive it to be a process and not a static thing. As with science (according to Royce and James) democracy is not a finished thing but a thinking which is on its way. It must be under the educating in-

fluence not only of its mistakes but even more of its ideals. The 'may-be' and the 'ought to be' must foregather on the frontiers of the 'is.' It is what man is capable of becoming rather than what he is at present that must be the source of his right to govern. The demos to which we bow must not be the mob clamoring over his natural claim to decide issues by the counting of noses, but a body under discipline in which the 'to be' is immensely more important than the 'is.'

Thirdly, and lastly, the doctrine of the educability of the common man to assume responsibility for the shaping of his destiny and that of his fellows must include constant and unrelaxing instruction as to spiritual as well as material values. The realities of our spiritual destiny must take in all our political planning a place ahead of material advance. Accepting the principle of the declaration: "Man doth not live by bread alone," we must be relentless in the insistence that the emphasis be placed on character which we have hitherto placed on success. The oft-quoted remark of Benjamin Disraeli, shortly after the passage of a sweeping Reform Bill, that "now we must educate our masters," ought, in a wider and deeper sense, point out the proper program for all contemplated reforms of every sort. How we are to accomplish this, shorn as we are (largely through our own remissness) of the right to train the youth of the land in religious matters, and shorn (largely through our own cowardice) of even the will to put our political science on a religious, or even a theistic, basis, I do not know. But that as citizens, if not as Christians, we must wake up to do something is becoming for many the firmest of convictions. If we had the courage to make a real effort, without damning that effort beforehand by the evisceration of Christian principles for the sake of a false appearance of unity, it is more than possible we should be able to say of our problem: 'Solvitur ambulando.' At any rate, only by such an effort may the wild rose find its affinity with the 'great White Rose of Paradise.' Only so, in what may well prove to be the darkest hour our civilization has hitherto known, can we look forward without misgiving to the victory of man over the 'vis inertiae' of his evolution.

Perhaps I may summarise what I have tried to say still more succinctly by saying that in facing the problem of democracy we have three paths from which to choose. We can, if we like (though few, I imagine *will* like), accept the static view of Demos as presented in Shakespeare's *Caliban*, a demos permanently assigned by Providence

to a place at the bottom of the social structure, the predestined slave, in spite of all indications of his higher possibilities, in a servile world, under the feet of a serene aristocracy, as represented by Prospero.

In the second place, we may, as some have chosen to do, accept the Caliban of Renan's drama, a being of colossal proportions, claiming and taking possession of powers limited only by the limitations of appetite and opportunity, a demos totally unregardful of any restraints such as might be imposed by the recognition of a higher law.

Or, in the third place (and it seems to me that this must be the Christian position) we may choose the path of a humanity created to attain the divine likeness and to co-operate in the fulfilment of a divine plan, a humanity educated by divine grace to exercise authority by virtue of the charter "All power is given unto Me in heaven and in earth," communicated to mankind by One Who is revealed as alike Son of God and Son of Man.

In the long run I fancy I have been but trying to express, with perhaps some over-indulgence in theological terminology, what was stated in more directly political terms more than thirty years ago at Princeton by Mr. Woodrow Wilson: "Self-government is not a mere form of institution, to be had when desired, if only proper pains be taken. It is a form of character. It follows upon the long discipline which gives a people self-possession, self-mastery, the habit of order and peace and common counsel, the reverence for law which will not fail, when they themselves become the makers of law, the steadiness and self-control of political maturity. And these things cannot be had without long discipline."

If we are able to accept such a view, and willing, moreover, to accept for our nation, without too much desire to rule the whole world, that long discipline with a flying goal as its aim;—if we are able to lift our eyes beyond the temporising and extemporising tyrannies of the present to the full prerogative of an ideal democracy, we shall not need to hesitate over the adoption of the motto: "Nil desperandum de Republica."

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PART IV

THE MINISTRY IN THE WORLD TODAY

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These are years when much in which we fondly trusted has been shown unworthy of our confidence. This statement, to be sure, has become a truism. But it is also the fact that much in which our nation seems to be putting its trust for the future, for "the world after the war," is certain to prove rather shaky, indeed thoroughly unsound. And that is not a truism, just yet. Although most of us recognize that from the wall upon which he was so precariously perched Humpty-Dumpty has had a great fall, not so many of us are clear that "all the king's horses and all the king's men cannot put Humpty together again." Still we rely on the "horses"—the machinery and the techniques and the blue-prints; still we rely on the "men"—our human capacities and capabilities. Yet it ought to be perfectly apparent that there is only one way in which Humpty-Dumpty can be "put together": that is, by the King himself, who alone can put anything together so that "it sticks together."

To drop the metaphor, it is only God, the ultimate and intimate Reality, who can save men; it is only a profound trust in God, so conceived, that can restore, re-integrate and re-adjust human nature. Millions of people, of course, are prepared to agree with this proposition; but their agreement is a matter of words, an altogether too easy acquiescence, rather than a radical understanding of the truth and a radical willingness to make the necessary act of decision. Even for those who are ready to do this, there comes always the problem of the sustaining and maintaining of that faith; and this is impossible, or nearly so, for *individuals* without the support of a community of faith, and without such expressive and empowering means of help as may be offered in such a community.

I

At this time, and with this prospect, the Christian Church is confronted with an opportunity and a challenge such as have not been offered to it for hundreds of years. For western civilisation has fallen. This is the blunt and brutal fact. Much which we value may be saved; perhaps very little will be lost, in the long run. But the thing itself—the articulated and integrated scheme of life which was our traditional civilisation—does not really any longer exist. Those who have most right to judge tell us that it can never be rebuilt. Of course something else will come in its place. What that will be we do not know, and our attempts to devise it are probably all beside the mark, although the consideration of the future “beyond the war” is valuable and essential for us in these days lest we be tempted to sink back into our old lethargy. But now is the time for the Christian Church, brought face to face with such an apocalyptic fact as the collapse of our civilisation, to take up once again, and courageously, its true work. Now is the time for the Christian ministry to become the unwavering agent of the Church, in representative and functional capacity, in that true work.

It is with this sombre background that one must approach the consideration of the priesthood in these latter days. Any other approach is bound to be futile, or to result in a misunderstanding of the task of the priest in a society such as ours, acting in his capacity as the servant of the Church which is both in and yet not of that society. At this very point, indeed, there is a subtle temptation today, both for priest and for Church. It is to fall victim to the suggestion that the Church (and, as its functioning agent, the priest) shall recognize its central function to be that of morale-builder for human society; the guarantor of certain high significant values; the heart of “the new order,” whatever that may be; the spiritual dynamo behind “the four freedoms.” We shall return to this later; but here we may say that, without a word of criticism of any of these things, one is bound to insist that the Church and its ministry cannot be satisfied with this, must contend against this mundane conception, must insist upon and exhibit the truth that the Church is certainly *in* yet not *of* this or any human society, but as “the society of charity” is *above* yet operative *in* this and any society. Nearly two thousand years ago, the author of the *Epistle to Diognetus* stated this clearly: “The Christians live in their own countries, but only as sojourners; they share the life of citizens, but endure

the lot of foreigners; every foreign land is to them a fatherland, and every fatherland a foreign land; they love all men, yet they are persecuted by all; they spend their existence upon earth, but their citizenship is in heaven."

And this duality, this double-citizenship, which St. Augustine portrayed in the *De Civitate Dei* as involving the two cities, of God and of men, is the only understanding of life which for the Christian can make sense of his status as pilgrim, deeply concerned with the *via* that it shall be good and lovely and worthy of God who himself trod it, but more deeply concerned with his true *patria* which is that God himself, who has made us for himself, and without whom our hearts here and now, and to all eternity, will be restless and without joy.

As representative of such a society as the Church must be when true to itself, the priest will see his vocation in our mundane society, come what may and how it may. His allegiance, and his duty, are supra-temporal and supra-national, not simply international. He is commissioned to act from men to God, and from God to men, in such manner that dignity, integrity and significance, beyond any values this world can offer, are given those for whom he is called upon to minister.

Such a task is the greatest and most exacting in the world. The Christian ministry in these days is no place for snivellers, nor for the easily pious, nor for those who lack the spirit of adventure in the high-ways beyond the frontiers of this life. It never was, of course; but in the years ahead of us, it will take added courage and determination to stand firm for the truth, above national or international hysteria. For the priest is the man who has seen the blinding vision of utter Reality himself, walking the ways of this world in Christ Jesus, and has given himself to the service of that Reality, so that through him something may be done by God for men. That is his task. It demands a total dedication and an undeviating loyalty. Less will not do.

II

We turn then to a consideration of the nature of the priestly work. The first significant fact about the priesthood is that the Christian priest does not speak of himself and for himself, but of and for the Christian community, the divine society which is the Catholic Church. His performance of his several duties, his preaching of the gospel, his celebration of the sacraments, his shepherding of the flock committed to

his care, are not done as his own bit of labour, but always as that of the commissioned representative of the great Christian tradition, for which he speaks and on behalf of which he acts. So it must be that he is ever supremely conscious of his tremendous obligation to know whereof he speaks and acts.

While it is obviously the inescapable truth that his statement of the historic faith of the Catholic Church will be mediated through his own personality, experience and understanding, it is even more true that he must state the *historic* faith, and not his own ideas or opinions, however brilliant or interesting they may be. It is to speak for that historic faith that he is commissioned; it is that historic faith which delivers him, and the people to whom he is sent, from the vagaries of the moment. With whatever necessary modifications and development there may be as year succeeds year, the faith in itself remains constant—built upon the supreme act of God himself, entering our human world in the Man Christ Jesus, redeeming us from selfishness and frustration back to himself, establishing a community of love in which we may realize our true nature as men, empowering us to live as men, and not as animals however sophisticated, in the midst of a world “good” as God created it but “naughty” in its sin and failure, preparing for us a future where our personal and social destiny may be achieved.

These abide . . .

The message to the Maid, the human birth,
The lesson, and the Young Man crucified.

And, as Alice Meynell goes on to say, it is these alone, no mere human theorizing or philosophizing (necessary as that may be), that do in fact constitute

The terrible, frightened, shamefast, whispered, sweet,
Heart-shattering secret of His way with us.

Secondly, it is in the celebration of the Church's expressive act of adoration, which is the offering to Reality of man's whole life through the Eucharistic Oblation, that the Christian priest's duty chiefly lies. He is ordained to offer the Holy Sacrifice, which is first of all “the continual remembrance of the sacrifice of the death of Christ,” and then the presentation of the whole of life, the natural order, human history, ourselves, to God in union with the oblation of Christ. Here again, the priest is the agent of the Church; he does not act of himself; it is not

"his mass" that he offers, but the Church's mass, the Church's Oblation, and he is but the agent of the Body of Christ, through duration of time and extent of space, in performing this characteristic rite of the Christian community. This is the priest's central labour, we have said; it is to take bread, bless bread, break bread, give bread. And this bread, taken, blessed, broken, given, is none other than the life of the world which becomes the life of God-made-man; offered to God, it is received back from him to be the nourishment of the souls of those who in a world which is not the Church live as members of the Church in order to bring the charity of the Church into every nook and cranny of men's daily life.

From that act flows directly the daily life of the priest himself. This must inevitably be a eucharistic life; in St. Ignatius' great phrase, "a living eucharist." The priest is himself to live a life which is taken by God, blessed by God, broken in sacrificial service for God, and given to God that it may be used by God for the service of men. No selfish seeking of privilege, no hunting for easy cures, no desire for personal success, no satisfaction with "institutional religion," can enter into the life of him who stands at the altar offering daily the self-denying oblation of the death of God the Son. And in such a world as will be ours, tomorrow, the demand for a sacrificial ministry will be brought in upon us with a devastating directness.

Because he is Christ's, the priest is called to be a Christ to his people: the mediator of God to men and men to God after the order of the crucified Lord. And so, thirdly, in his parish work, teaching duties, or whatever field his labour may be found, the priest will stand for and speak for the stern and forgiving love of God in Christ. He will be the compassionate servant of the servants of God. But this does not mean that he will be silly or unrealistic in his recognition of the facts about man and about men. The priest will see the sin of man, and the exceeding sinfulness of that sin. He will call his people to repentance and to the sacramental means whereby the historic Church has provided for the restoration of men to the life in charity. And beyond this, he will set himself, not as of himself but as agent of the Church, to be the faithful friend to whom all may turn, advisor and companion, rebuker of evil as well as father of those who are his spiritual children.

And fourthly, the priest will be the prophet of God's righteousness. There is an urgent necessity that his prophetic voice be raised in the

cause of social justice, economic freedom and true liberty for all men, of all classes and races. He stands unflinchingly for justice, and he is to be one who is so involved in the life of his secular community, be it town or nation or world, that he recognizes sin and evil where they are, denounces them for what they are, and is concerned to eradicate them so far as is possible from our midst. But he must beware lest he suggest that the Christian Church is identified with any of the secular programmes or parties which are engaged in this process; it is the business of the Church, and of the minister, to stand within and yet above all party disputes, and to see to it that the only criterion of judgment is the will of God, discerned in justice and executed in justice, with the end that abundant life shall be secured for men. The priest is not a "party man."

III

What in fact we have said is that the Christian minister is to be the priest who offers the Church's sacrifice and dispenses the Church's entrusted gift of the life of God-made-man; the prophet who speaks for the Church that which is the true word of God to men; the pastor who cares for the flock. All this is very old, very tried, very obvious indeed. Is there nothing new, then, which we should say, for this time?

Yes, there is. And that is the simple truth that in our world, both today and tomorrow, it will be more and more difficult to be true to this calling. The multiplication of techniques, good in themselves and very useful in the work of the ministry; the temptation to be diverted into attractive by-paths and side-roads which bear some relation to the ministerial task; the suggestion that the Church can be conformed to the pattern of this world, in one way or another depending on the social structure which emerges beyond the war's end: all of these will tend to suggest evasions or denials of the priest's chief duty and obligation.

Those who are called to be priests are always to be faithful dispensers of the word and sacraments, and true pastors of the flock. The Christian gospel, which is the only enduring hope of man, is to be preached . . . and this must be done surely in as winsome and appealing a way as possible, with every employment of new thought, new pastoral method, new science and philosophy, to make it come home to the hearts and consciences of men. But, in the end, whether those to whom we are sent hear or forbear, it is the duty of the priest to be

faithful to his commission, and not to barter it away for any price, or in response to any appeal. Our immediate *danger*, it would seem, is that we may give over our priesthood, and the Church its true calling, in order that we may become the unpaid but eager agents of national or international schemes or systems. Hence, it is our immediate *obligation* to remember that the Church is not here (nor are its priests ordained) to be merely the spiritual department of any nation or government, however nobly conceived; of any order of society secularly speaking, be it democratic or otherwise; of any international world-state, even if it offer worldly justice for all men.

Perhaps one may put this very forcibly. In our present world crisis, we do not know what the final result will be. Each of us has his hopes, perhaps his ultimate confidence; but let us in this country never forget that God may over-rule even our American hopes and confidences. There is no guarantee whatever that in the short-term range which we mortals can envisage, "conquer we must, if our cause it be just." In that sense, the justest cause in all history ended on a Cross; and the victory which Easter asserts was known then and is known today only in the secret hearts of the faithful and never obviously and immediately to the world. It is the Christian and Catholic Church's supreme task to speak to men, whether their secular causes be defeated or be victorious. No matter what may happen, no matter what defeats or victories are ahead, God reigns, and God's Church endures, although in perhaps very different external guise. The only real victory we Christians know is the victory of faith, the faith which overcomes the world. Unless all our Christianity be delusion, it is true that while we may not and do not yet see all things brought in subjection unto God, we see Jesus . . . and that is enough for this life, and the life to come. Thereby we are more than conquerors.

This is no retreat from the world. It is this, on the contrary, that has made Cardinal Falhauber and the German Catholics, Martin Niemoeller and the German Evangelicals, strong in their suffering; that gave the Russian Christians courage during their day of persecution. . . . It is this, indeed, that we are in danger of losing in America, unless we assert once again the integrity and the holiness, the separateness, of the Church, even while we insist on its involvement in the total life of men and the nation. That is the task of the priesthood today; that is the significance of the new emphasis on the liturgy as speaking

the mind of the Church and realizing the fellowship of the Church; that is the importance of Catholic and Christian action, as seed of the Kingdom of God in this world, but seed which *this* world can neither utterly destroy nor bring to fruition. It is the supernatural reality of the Church, which fulfils its mundane task of bringing more abundant life to men "at this present" and points to "the heavenlies" where such life is man's in its fullness.

Let us suppose an overwhelming victory for the United Nations, with whose cause our own country is inextricably involved. Let us suppose a peace with justice, in which men and nations are persuaded to live in equity one with another. Let us suppose an end to racial hatred and privilege, to economic aggrandizement by Anglo-Saxon or other empires at the expense of those not in positions of supremacy, to social injustice and economic oppression. All of these are promised us, when and if the United Nations achieve victory. They are promised in good faith; and it is conceivable, although not entirely likely, that the promises will be fully implemented. Will the result, then, be the establishment among men of the Kingdom of God?

The answer is simply, No. What would happen would be a relatively more just human society, a relatively more satisfactory ordering of the affairs of men. This is God's will; upon it we must unalterably insist: that the course of this world be justly, and peaceably, ordered, and by *God's* governance. But even then man remains man; sin remains sin; the Church's gospel remains the Church's gospel. To such a world, which because of sin hates that gospel, even while it talks glibly and easily of defending Christian values and Christian principles and Christian ideals, the Church must still declare the *whole* counsel of God. And the ministers of the Church must still represent the Church, insisting forever and again, relentlessly, bravely, that it is only by the supernatural gifts of faith, hope and charity; by God's self-donation in the Lord Jesus Christ, known in the Body which makes him to be alive in the world today; that it is only so, only in this supreme way, that among the sundry and manifold changes of the world, men's hearts may *surely* there be fixed where true joys are to be found, and where alone human life, in all of its strange beauty, sad nobility, tragic frustration, bewildering complexity and degrading sinfulness, is given true and enduring significance, dignity and hope.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

I

What is the nature of the Christian gospel, in relation to the changing circumstances of its presentation? How far do economic, political, social and other conditions change the *gospel itself*? In the light of this consideration, what is the function of the Christian priest, in his sacerdotal, prophetic and pastoral work?

II

How far do present "total" war influences affect the Church's position? What are the differences between our own country, and the strictly totalitarian lands? How are things likely to be after the war, so far as the Church's influence is concerned?

III

In what ways will the ministry be called upon to "come out from among" other "morale-building" agencies? What dangers do you feel face the Church *just because* of our national support of religious principles and religious freedom? Or are there no dangers? Are we realistic and Christian enough in our appraisal of this kind of blessing from the state, and from the mass of semi-converted people?

IV

How can the Church's task of working towards "a new earth" be carried on without total identification with that world? On the other hand, how can the Church's preaching of man's heavenly destiny be carried on without suggesting a disregard of this world? What value do you find in the Christian notion of this world as *via* or pathway for pilgrims towards their true father-land? How does such a conception affect our ideas of the Church's ministry and its work?

THE MYSTERY OF TIME IN THE MIRROR OF FAITH

By RICHARD KRONER

The Alumni Address at the Union Theological Seminary Commencement,
May 19, 1942

In the fourth Gospel Jesus says: "And this is life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." The eternal is the divine. But eternity has also a time dimension, it is the time in which God lives, for He lives from eternity to eternity. Eternal means everlasting; eternity means time without an end, or temporal endlessness, temporal infinity. This infinity is the mystery of time; it is a mystery, because reason cannot solve the problem implied in it.

What is the nature of time? Plato taught that it is 'the moving image of eternity,' a definition hardly satisfying to the intellect, since eternity itself is as great a mystery as time, or rather is itself this mystery. If we reverse the definition of time given by Plato, we should conclude that eternity is the immovable image of time, a time that does not change, that persists in everlasting identity. But is it not the very nature of time to change continuously, to move incessantly? Is not 'the march of time' the very mark of time, and is not a time that does not move but stands still the very denial of time altogether? What remains of the nature of time, if we deprive it of its movement? A clock that has no moving hands, no longer announces the time; it has no function, no meaning at all. Is eternity the simple negation of time? Is it nothing but timelessness? How is it then related to the infinity of time?

According to Plato eternity really means timelessness, an existence not affected by the stream of time; not subject to any kind of change or alteration. It means that aspect of truth which we to-day call validity, and which characterizes the inner essence of the Platonic Ideas. These ideas, as they are the patterns of all things, do not change; their validity does not depend on the temporal processes; on the contrary these processes depend on the validity of true ideas, or as we would say to-day, on the validity of the laws which rule over nature. What happens in

time, is determined by eternal laws, by eternal ideas. The sphere of temporal processes therefore contrasts, in Plato, with the sphere of timeless truth; the phenomenal world contrasts with the real world of the Ideas.

There is a certain analogy between this Platonic doctrine and the biblical view. As the Ideas are enthroned in a realm beyond the visible world of ever-changing events, so God the invisible Ruler of the visible world is enthroned beyond the restless bustle of life and the turmoil of unsteady man. Like the Ideas, God is everlasting and remains ever the same; indeed He is Himself the eternal truth represented by the Ideas in the system of Plato.

But there is also a deep chasm between the Platonic and the biblical perspective. The Ideas are immutable, the biblical God acts. The Ideas rule over the temporal world as the theoretical truth rules over the special cases of its application; they rule in other words in a timeless way. The living God on the contrary rules over the ever-changing world not only by means of timeless laws or ideas, but also by temporal actions. He participates in the life of mortal man; He reveals Himself to man; He turns to man, warns him, punishes him or rewards him. In Plato the eternal and the temporal abide in their particular realms. The Ideas represent eternal being, the phenomena represent temporal becoming and moving. The biblical God is not only eternal being, He also moves and enjoys a temporal existence. This momentous difference between the Platonic and the biblical way of thinking is based on a different evaluation of change, and therefore of time. Time in Plato is the order of a world that is meaningless, precisely in so far as it is subject to change; time in the mirror of biblical faith is the order of a world that is meaningful, precisely because it develops. Time has therefore no real function in the philosophy of Plato; indeed it has no true reality at all. It causes illusion and error. Truth is timeless. No inward connection exists between eternity and time. The mystery of time is not yet revealed. No attempt is made to preserve the temporal realm within the realm of eternity, to interpret time from the aspect of eternal truth.

Plato evades the world in which we live as mortal men; he flees the temporal world in which error and corruption occur, in which no perfection can ever be reached. The eternal realm of the Ideas is his refuge. Thus he does not solve the problem of time, he does not even

so much as discover its insolubility. This lack of insight is at the bottom of his definition of time. He can call it the moving picture of eternity, because he has not the ever-changing human scene of life and history in mind, but only the perpetual and never changing movement of the stars by which we measure the periods of time. This movement indeed can be called a picture of eternity, because it remains ever the same. It does not mirror the most characteristic feature of time, its reforming and revolutionizing, its ever dynamic force. Is there a definite meaning in this dynamic movement, has it a definite relation to the eternal truth? Is history meaningful? Is there a purpose of God in the moving of human life? All these questions are answered by the biblical scheme of time, they are not even raised in Platonism. The mystery of time has its true mirror in faith only.

The abyss of time opens, if we try to conceive of it as a whole. If we want to fathom the ultimate meaning of life and history, we face the problem of the ultimate relation between timeless truth and the time-process. To be ultimately meaningful this process should participate in the timeless truth, not only as it does in Plato, in so far as the phenomena are controlled by laws eternally valid, but rather in so far as the phenomena change, develop, occur as meaningful events, or in other words in so far as they possess the full concreteness and individuality of life and history. But then, the time in which we live this life and experience the development of history can no longer be any segment of an infinite line, that comes from a meaningless past and runs away to a meaningless future, an accidental fragment in an endless chain; rather it must be the instrument of an eternal purpose, and therefore the appearance of an eternal will. This solution of the time problem cannot be granted by philosophic thought, it can be granted by religious imagination alone. Pure Reason is unable to disentangle itself from the difficulties it meets, if it tries to settle the problem of infinity.

Facing an endless past and an endless future the intellect becomes giddy; on the other hand the same intellect cannot permit the assumption of a first beginning and an ultimate end, since the very concepts of a beginning and of an end presuppose the existence of time. A beginning and an end of time itself seem to be absurd. The pure intellect encounters thus a desperate alternative. It can neither accept the infinity nor the finiteness of time. But not this intellectual failure

alone makes time mysterious. If only the idea of quantitative or mathematical infinity were at stake, the intellect could cope with it as it copes with the infinity of space or of the number system. Time however is not only a quantitative measure; the problem of the meaning of life and history is involved in the problem of time. The mystery of time arises out of this problem.

When we reflect on the meaning of the temporal process, we discover the deeper origin of the idea of eternity. It is not the timeless and unchanging truth alone that demands the sphere beyond all temporal change, it is rather man's longing for ultimate perfection that was the hidden stimulus even in Plato's conception of the realm of Ideas. *Moral ultimacy* more than timeless truth is the deepest root of the mystery of time, for moral ultimacy contradicts the ultimate separation of the Eternal and the temporal; it contradicts the meaningless and consequently the endlessness of time. Moral finality cannot be reconciled with temporal infinity. Moral ultimacy is a kind of *spiritual infinity*, and this infinity has to be superimposed upon the conception of time, since this conception depends not only on the mathematical or physical, but also on the spiritual structure of the world in which we live. Man possesses a moral sense of ultimacy; otherwise the commandment of Jesus, Be perfect as your father in heaven is perfect, would never have appealed to man, and would not have revolutionized the moral standard of mankind. This sense of moral ultimacy however is denied by the temporality, the instability and relativity, the transitoriness and futility of human existence; it is denied by the regime of the 'bloody tyrant,' as Shakespeare calls time because it destroys life and beauty ever and ever again. If time is infinite, then all moral efforts of mankind and all spiritual achievements are finally meaningless, for the bloody tyrant will bury them all without any discrimination. Life then is a phantastic nothingness, we ourselves are ghostly shadows emerging and disappearing in the ocean of infinity.

Moral ultimacy denies mere temporality; it rejects all lukewarm compromises and provisional standards of life; it demands perfection. It is this ultimacy that urges Faust to welcome the moment to which he can say: You are the highest moment, last for ever! Temporal restlessness and imperfection frustrates ever anew all attempts to make life ultimately meaningful; time even challenges man's idea of final and absolute moral aims and ends. In the deadly struggle between

time and moral ultimacy faith, and faith alone, brings about the decision. It stresses the supremacy of the spirit. Man possesses as it were a 'secret weapon' with which he can fight the bloody tyrant time. Spiritual infinity, though it is in a struggle with time that can never end on the level of time, is ultimately superior to temporal infinity. Ultimately the temporal world cannot be self-subsistent, it must depend on that which is ultimate in itself, and it must receive its ultimate meaning from this highest source. Our longing for moral ultimacy leads to faith in God as the ultimate origin of time itself. The mystery of time therefore must reflect itself in a spiritual image of time.

If we look at the Bible we discover that in its account time no longer is infinite. God overarches the whole course of time. Time is a whole in Him and through Him! He is the beginning and He is the end of time. Time begins with the Creation and it ends with the Judgment; there is a first and there is a last day. Faith solves the problem of time-infinity by the acknowledgement of the ultimate superiority of the spirit. Of course, it solves this problem not within the sphere of intellectual thought—in this sphere it is definitively insoluble—but by means of spiritual or *religious imagination*. In this imagination time appears subject to moral ultimacy, it is embraced by spiritual eternity, indeed it is spiritualized itself, and eternity on the other hand is imaged in temporal terms. This is the meaning of the story that God created the world in seven days. The purpose of God frames time; it supplies a spiritual significance to the temporal process. In the mirror of faith time loses its independence and autonomy that make it infinite; it appears as a means of God's eternal purpose. Thus it can no longer threaten man's own mortal aspirations and efforts; on the contrary it is supposed to serve them eventually. Faith triumphs over mere temporality. Time becomes an instrument in the hand of God: it becomes *eschatological*. Eschatology concerns the end of endless time, its ultimate end. This ultimate end images the ultimate meaning in terms of time.

In the picture of faith man is no longer a mere drop in an infinite stream, a forlorn accident that emerges in order to evanesce again as if he had never lived at all; rather he participates in the eternal purpose of God. He comes from God and he goes to God. He is included in the divine, and his earthly time is meaningful in the eternal spirit of

God. Time has a spiritual meaning, and it exists only on account of this meaning. It makes possible the development of mankind towards the ultimate moral goal; it will end, when this goal is reached with the assistance of God, or when the 'day of the Lord' has arrived. Time allows man to display his moral strength; it allows God to examine man. Time is thus an element in God's Creation; its existence and its nature are determined by its function in the fabric of the divine purpose. Of course, the mystery of time, that is the tension between the secular and the sacred sphere, perseveres in the biblical scheme. It is not replaced by a rational solution, it is rather mirrored in faith.

There is however a difference between the Old and the New Testament with respect to this mirror. The Old Testament stresses the tension between the spheres. God has entered into a covenant with His people; He takes care of them. But they are not fully subject to His will; on the contrary they defy His will ever and ever again. 'Man and God, earth and heaven remain two sharply separated domains in spite of the alliance between God and the chosen people, in spite of God's providence and omnipotence in ruling over the world and pursuing His purpose. God was all in all in the beginning, but now in the midst of the earthly time He is remote in heaven, while man labours during his days and passes away. To be sure, life does not lose its infinite value under these circumstances, for its labour serves the purpose of God. But the goal is as remote as the beginning. The Old Testament rests in the memory of the *past* and in the hope of the *future*, it does not rest in the *present*. It is the present the Preacher judges when he says: Vanity of vanities, all is vanity.

In the New Testament the scene is radically transformed. The kingdom of heaven is at hand. The time has come when the Lord will come to earth and fulfill His promise. The Ancient of Days approaches the present. It is the *present*, no longer the past and the future, that takes the central place in faith. This revolution transforms thoroughly the relation between time and eternity as it transforms the relation between God and man. The distance between the extremes is dwindling. Time and eternity meet each other in the present; the present unites them. The end of time has arrived or is near; the end of history is imminent. Moral ultimacy is reached in the person and message of Jesus the Christ. Eschatology is "real-

ized," as Professor C. H. Dodd characterizes the new religious consciousness. The mystery of time is mirrored in the new faith as in a new light.

Eternity, the distinctive quality of the realm of timeless Ideas, this is the doctrine of Plato. Eternity, the distinctive quality of God living beyond the bounds of the temporal world, but ruling over, and acting in, this world, this is the Old Testament conception. Eternity as the very present, this is the revelation brought about by the Gospel of Jesus. This new light signifies a momentous step on the way towards the spiritualization of the relation between time and eternity. God is present; the present is the divine time-dimension. There is no time-distance between man and God for him who believes in the message of Jesus. God is present. To seek God in the past and in the future means to seek Him in the *temporal* world only; to seek Him in the present means to seek Him in His *eternal* light. The present as interpreted by Jesus is eternity. Especially the fourth Gospel stresses this view.

There is a deep difference between the nature of the past and the future on the one hand and the nature of the present on the other hand, not only with respect to the mirror of time in faith and revelation, but also with respect to the time-order of secular experience. Past and future exist as images of the mind only, they do not exist in reality. The present alone is the actual time dimension, the only real time in which we live. Even the past is nothing but a present recalled, and the future is only a present anticipated. The present alone is really lived through. Past and future are objects of our imagination, be it of our memory or of our hopes and fears; the present alone really happens and occurs. The present is the time-dimension of actuality and activity. We possess the past *as* a recalled present, and we possess it *in* the present only; it is a re-presented time. And the same is true in an analogous way with respect to the future: we possess it only *in* the present by means of anticipation. The present thus comprises all time-dimensions in itself. *Praesens complicat tempus*, as Nicolaus Cusanus says. It embraces past and future, past and future exist as past and as future in the present only. Therefore the present is not, as physics would think, a certain point on an endless line, like every point in time; it does not lie on this line at all. The physical time has no present, it is the standpoint of the experiencing and acting person in time that makes

possible the consciousness of the present. There is no present without this consciousness, because there is no standpoint in time.

If we conceive of time as an endless line that continually moves or as the order of an infinite series of events which follow each other, the present is no time-point at all. It is a standstill, a point not within the stream, but rather on its bank, a point from which the stream of time can be overlooked as the historian overlooks the past. The present does not belong to this infinite series, because it is not an object of contemplation, either physical or historical, but the very actuality of life, that cannot be contemplated, but only lived. Contemplated present has already passed away.

The present therefore has in itself the possibility of a more intimate, a more inward and a more spiritual access to the ultimate than the past and the future can have. The past may become legendary and the future may be apprehended in an apocalyptic fashion; the images of the Creation and of the Last Judgment may reflect the divine eternity, the present alone can *actually* attain to the consciousness of fulfilment. This mystery of the present marks the revelation of Jesus the Christ and is mirrored in the faith of his followers. They felt that the day of the Lord was at hand; that the kingdom of God was growing during their life-time; they witnessed the approach of ultimate fulfilment in their own present time. *In Jesus eternity was present.*

But the mystery of time assumed a new aspect when they experienced the cross. It was the transition from the present Jesus to the reminiscence of the past. Faith refused to acknowledge this loss. Jesus had passed away, but Christ was alive. The *presence of eternity* as experienced in his lifetime changed into the *eternal presence* of the risen as it is reflected in the majestic image of Christ sitting on the throne of God in heaven and saying: I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last. In this image the mystery of the present appears as the mystery of Christ Himself, being the eternal Logos and Son of God.

THE DATE OF THE LAST SUPPER

By SAMUEL I. FEIGIN

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There is an early Talmudic (Tannaitic) tradition that "they hanged Jesus on the day before the Passover" (Sanhedrin 43a). John also states that Jesus was delivered to Pilate before the Passover: "Then led they Jesus from Caiaphas unto the hall of judgment; and it was early; and they went not to the hall of judgment, lest they should be defiled; but that they might eat the Passover" (18: 28), and Pilate judged him at the preparation of the Passover (19: 14).

The day of the crucifixion was Friday. This is stated plainly in all the four gospels (Matt. 27: 62, Mark 15: 42-43, Luke 23: 50-56, John 19: 31). The resurrection is reported to have been on Sunday, three days after the crucifixion (Matt. 28: 1 ff., Mark 16: 19, Luke 24: 1, John 20: 1).

Accordingly, the events were in the following order: Two days before Passover, Wednesday, the high priests received Judas and accepted his offer of betrayal. One day before Passover, Thursday, the Last Supper was eaten. Later that night Jesus was arrested and examined before Annas and Caiaphas. Early Friday, he was examined by Pilate. About noon he was condemned. About three o'clock he died. About this time the Paschal lamb was being slaughtered. Burial took place before nightfall. Nisan 15 (Passover) coincided with the Sabbath. On Sunday, news of his resurrection was brought to his disciples. (For the dates of these events, see A. T. Olmstead, "The Chronology of Jesus' Life," *Anglican Theological Review*, Vol. XXIV, No. 1 [Jan. 1942], p. 23).

These plain statements of John and the Talmud seem to be contradicted by the Synoptic Gospels, according to which Jesus ate the Paschal meal as his last supper. Matthew (26: 17-19) reads: "On the first day of the festival of Unleavened Bread, the disciples came to Jesus and said, 'Where do you wish us to make the preparation for you to eat the Passover supper?' And he said, 'Go into the city, to a certain man,

and say to him, The Master says, 'My time is near. I am going to keep the Passover at your house with my disciples.' So the disciples did as Jesus directed them, and prepared the Passover supper." The same is stated by Mark: "On the first day of the festival of Unleavened Bread, on which it was customary to kill the Passover Lamb" (Mark 14: 12).

Luke here differs from the other Synoptic Gospels, stating: "When the day of Unleavened Bread came, on which the Passover Lamb had to be sacrificed" (Luke 22: 7-8). He omits, as we see, the phrase "the first day."

Since the first day of the Passover is the fifteenth of Nisan which begins, according to Jewish reckoning, with the preceding night, how could Jesus have told his disciples on the first day to go to prepare for the Passover? The preparation must have been made before nightfall. Moreover, the killing of the Passover lamb usually took place on the fourteenth of Nisan, before the first day of the festival of Unleavened Bread.

The situation becomes even more incomprehensible when we follow the account of the Last Supper. This story, following the statement about the first day of the Unleavened Bread, gives reason to think that it was the Paschal meal. "When evening came, he reclined with the twelve disciples. And as they were eating he said, 'I tell you, one of you will betray me.' . . . As they were eating Jesus took a loaf and blessed it, and broke it in pieces, and gave it to his disciples, saying, 'Take this and eat it. It is my body.' And he took the wine-cup and gave thanks and gave it to them, saying, 'You must all drink from it, for this is my blood.' . . . After singing the hymn, they went out of the city and up to the Mount of Olives" (Matt. 26: 20-30). The same story is told in Mark 14: 17-25. But instead of Matthew's statement, "When evening came, he reclined with his twelve disciples," Mark declares, "When it was evening he came with the Twelve. And when they reclined and ate. . . ."

We might think that they were eating the prepared Passover meal in the appointed house, but (1) no mention is made of the Paschal Lamb (the main part of the ceremony). (2) No allusion was made to the bitter herbs, which could have been interpreted as a premonition of impending tragedy. (3) He gave the bread first and then the wine. On Passover night the benediction of the holy day is made first on

wine; then follows the food. (4) On the Passover night everyone drinks four cups of wine; there was no need to give his cup to the disciples.

Thus it is very doubtful that the supper was the Paschal meal. It seems rather that we have here a plain everyday meal, beginning with the eating of bread and ending with a cup of wine, used for the final benediction on the food. He divided some bread among his disciples, as is customary. He also gave them wine from his cup. Indeed, the meal is mentioned by John, who does not designate it as the Paschal meal but only as "the meal of the evening" (John 13: 2).

It may seem that the text in Mark favors the assumption that Jesus and his disciples went into the house where the Passover was prepared. However, the difference between Matthew's text: "he reclined with his twelve disciples," and Mark's text, "he came with the twelve," is due either to some misreading or intentional emendation of the original. If the original was written in Hebrew the change is easily explained. The verb was יָסַב , namely, הִפִּיל *hif'il*, "he reclined," the term used for posture of the eater both on Passover and other nights of the year (*Berakoth* 6: 6; *Nedarim* 4: 4; *Sanhedrin* 2: 1, 3, 4; *Negaim* 13: 9). But the verb was misread יָסַב or יָסַב , "he turned," in *qal*, used for indicating coming into the house, although the object is omitted here.

If the text, however, was Aramaic, the causative סָבַב , "he reclined," might have been avoided intentionally, because the same verb appears in the text of Mark in the following sentence: "When they were reclining and eating." The omitted verb was replaced by a suitable one, "he came," (בָּרַח), although the place where he came is not stated. If the house where the Passover meal was prepared is meant, he should have stated, "he came there." Thus the verb "he came" cannot be adduced as a proof that the house of the Passover is meant, since it is either a scribal error or a scribal emendation. Actually no mention is made of eating the Passover meal in these two Gospels.

Luke, however, certainly thought that the supper was the Paschal meal: "When the time came, he took his place at the table, with the Apostles about him. And he said to them, 'I have greatly desired to eat this Passover Supper with you before I suffer.' . . ." He took a cup first, then a loaf of bread (Luke 22: 14-21). No mention is made, however, of the Paschal Lamb, or of bitter herbs. It seems evident

that Luke wanted to explain both difficulties: Why should a Passover meal be prepared on the first day of the unleavened bread, while the Passover evening is still to come? His answer was, it was not the first day of the unleavened bread, but the approach of the festival in general. The second difficulty is: Why did Jesus go to the trouble of preparing a Passover meal which he did not eat at all? The answer was, he did eat it.

But supposing that Luke is right, that the night was the Passover night, how could one explain the subsequent events of that night and the following day? (1) Is it possible that the high priest and the other dignitaries would choose the night of the Passover for the time of apprehension of Jesus? (2) Is it possible that they would deliver Jesus to Pilate to be crucified on the holy day when some of the Synoptic Gospels agree that the elders decided "it must not be during the festival, or there will be riots" (Matt. 26: 3-4; Mark 14: 1-2)? Luke omits the word about the festival, because actually Jesus was crucified according to his account after the Paschal meal had been eaten. He states therefore, "And the high priest and the scribe were casting about for a way to put him to death, for they were afraid of the people" (Luke 22: 2). But it is clear that he left out of his source the word "festival"; he "corrected" his source here as he did in the case of "the first day of the festival." (3) It is very surprising to find the designation of Friday as the day of preparation, and moreover, even the Saturday after that is described as the "day after the preparation" (Matt. 27: 62).

The last question can be solved by realizing that originally not every Friday was called the day of preparation, but that one Friday alone, because in it they arranged the Paschal meal. Jesus told his disciples to prepare this meal. The preparation really consisted of setting the table with all the Paschal paraphernalia. Actually John states plainly: "It was the preparation of the Passover" (John 19: 14). Of course, Mark's present text, "It was now evening, because it was the preparation day, that is, the day before the Sabbath" (Mark 15: 42), implies that the preparation day is Friday in general. But it is clear that the phrase, "that is, the day before the Sabbath," is a gloss. Preparation referred to the *Seder*, the arranging of the Paschal meal. Since, according to the present text, this was impossible, because the

Passover meal had already been eaten the day before, the term is explained as referring to the Saturday in general.

This preparation was apparently applied to the time when work was forbidden. Thus in those places where work was forbidden on the whole day before the Passover the whole day would be preparation day. In those places where it was merely forbidden on the second half of the day, only that half would be preparation. At six o'clock of the day, that is, midday, began the preparation (John 19: 14), because in Judea only from that hour on work was forbidden (Pesahim 4: 5), while in Galilee no work was done for the whole day. Since no special time of ceasing work was set for Friday, we might think that originally that day was not regarded as a preparation day. However, Augustus relieved the Jews from certain legal duties on the Sabbath day and on the Preparation which preceded it from the ninth hour (Josephus, *Antiquities*, XVI, 163). The preparation is not from noon, but from the ninth hour. This short time of recess from work would hardly give the name of Preparation Day to Friday.

Since the Last Supper of the Synoptic Gospels was not, and could not have been, a Paschal meal, the question arises: How did the extant text come to state, "in the first day of the festival"? The answer to it seems to be found in a mistranslation of the original document. It contained *לְיוֹם א' לַחֹדֶשׁ*, "in one day to the festival." First stating that there were two days to the Passover (Matt. 26: 2; Mark 14: 1), the original narrator states, "when there was one day left," he prepared for himself a place to celebrate the festival. But these words can be rendered also, "in the first day of the festival," namely, reading the *א'* not as cardinal *אֶחָד*, "one," but as ordinal *אֶחָד לַחֹדֶשׁ*, "first," although *אֶחָד* is the usual form in Mishnaic Hebrew. If the text was written in Aramaic, the mistake was due to obliterating the *ל* to *ר*. Having the form *רַחֲמֵי* he translated "of the festival." The translator of the original document having made this blunder, the plain meal became thus a Passover meal. Luke was, evidently, not aware of the original text. He only smoothed out the difficulties raised by this mistranslation. Actually, Jesus was crucified on a Friday, on the eve of the Passover. The Jews asked to remove the body of Jesus and the other executed ones, because "it was the preparation, because that Saturday was a great day" (John 19: 31), namely, many pilgrims having come to

Jerusalem, the crucifixion of Jews may have caused a revolt. The preparation, of course, is for the celebration of the first night of the festival.

We see that originally the Synoptic Gospels were not out of harmony with John concerning the Last Supper. All hinges on a mistranslation or an obliteration of a single letter.*

* The simple solution of the seeming contradiction in the Gospels concerning the date of the Last Supper proposed in this article seems to me preferable to the far-fetched assumptions that the writers of the Gospels were ignorant of Jewish laws of that period, or even that the Galileans celebrated the Passover a day before the Judeans, and the like. There is, however, no need to enter into criticism of these theories.

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PAPIAS AND THE GOSPELS

By ROBERT M. GRANT

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For many years it has been a debated point in the history of the N.T. canon which of our four gospels were known to Papias, bishop of Hierapolis in the second century. The importance of Papias' witness is increased by the probability that he flourished early in the second century, rather than around 150, where he is usually dated. Harnack admits that Irenaeus' mention of Papias as an ἀρχαῖος ἀνὴρ (v.33. 4) shows that Papias wrote at least 20–30 years before Irenaeus.¹ On the other hand, he claims that Papias' words in *H.E.* iii. 39. 3, "all that ever I carefully learned and carefully recalled from the elders," show that his book cannot have been written earlier than about 100. Yet he admits that some of these presbyters lived to the middle of the century. Papias' words cannot supply us with a chronological datum. But it is true that he knew the daughters of Philip (*H.E.* iii. 39. 9), who were grown up by the year 54 (Acts xxi. 19) and who Harnack admits must have died by about the year 110. This, of course, is guesswork; they may easily have died much earlier.

Vernon Bartlet, I am sure, was right in dating Papias' birth about 60 and his work in the reign of Trajan. That is where Eusebius places him, after all—immediately after Clement of Rome—and Eusebius had read his entire work.²

That he was a hearer of John, as Irenaeus said, is quite likely; but that his master was John the elder rather than John the apostle seems equally clear, unless the apostle wrote the Revelation. According to Eusebius Papias used testimonies from I John and I Peter, as well as a story about a woman accused falsely of many sins before the Lord, which the Gospel of the Hebrews contains. This story is probably

¹ Harnack, *Chron.* i. 357; it should be stated that Irenaeus' tendency is the other way—the apocalypse was revealed "not long ago, but, almost in our own generation, at the end of Domitian's reign" (v.30.3). Possibly, however, he was simply transcribing the words of his source (W. Bousset, *Schulbetrieb*, 281).

² J. V. Bartlet in *Amicitiae Corolla* (1933), 15 ff.; see his article "Papias" in *Dict. Christ and Gosps.*

the one which is now found in our Fourth Gospel, though many of the best manuscripts, as well as Tertullian and Origen, do not give it. That it was part of John in Papias' day may be doubted.

What gospels did he know? He certainly knew Mark. He received his "introduction" to it from the presbyter, Aristion or (more likely) John. "Mark, indeed, having been the interpreter of Peter, wrote accurately, though not in order, all that he recalled of what was either said or done by the Lord. For he neither heard the Lord, nor was he a follower of his, but at a later date (as I said) of Peter; who used to adapt his instructions to the needs [of the moment], but not with a view to putting together the Dominical oracles in orderly fashion: so that Mark did no wrong in thus writing some things as he recalled them. For he kept a single aim in view: not to omit anything of what he heard, nor to state anything therein falsely" (*H.E.* iii. 39. 15, Oulton). What are the charges against Mark, from which the presbyter is defending him? His work is not in order (the presbyter admits this, but gives an explanation); but more important, it is not accurate, for it omits doings and teachings of Christ and perhaps makes some false statements (the Messianic secret?). The presbyter denies and tries to refute these charges. But against what standard is Mark being compared? Certainly not Matthew, of whom Papias gives a somewhat derogatory notice. Possibly John, although John's orderliness may be more apparent to us than to his contemporaries; and if John the presbyter wrote the gospel, as so many critics have thought, he is not likely to have defended even his principal source (Mark) against his own book. It seems more likely that the gospel in question is that of Luke, which definitely states in its prologue that it is written accurately *and* in order,³ though (like Mark) not by an eyewitness. The presbyter points out that (a) Mark was not an eyewitness (does he imply "either"?) and (b) he did not even profess to write in order. He wrote everything he heard, but Peter may not have told him everything. Thus the presbyter, and Papias, knew Luke's gospel, a point which will be strengthened a little later. As for Acts, the mention of Justus Barsabbas in Papias' work might be derived from Acts i. 23, though of course the story about his safely drinking deadly poison is

³ After Professor Cadbury's analysis in *Beginnings* ii, few would hold that "Luke" claims to write in order; but so the presbyter may have understood him. On "order" in Papias, see F. H. Colson in *JTS* 14: 62 ff. (rhetorical arrangement), and A. Wright, *ibid.*, 298 ff. (chronological). Either interpretation fits in well with this argument.

not. The unpleasant narrative of Judas' death, which shows him tormented by discharges of pus and worms, may be amplified from Acts i. 18, the verse on which Cramer gives it in his *Catena* (iii. 12); but Papias may easily have got it from oral tradition. There is little evidence, in any case, that the Acts were generally known as early as Papias' time,⁴ and he could have known Luke as a separate work.

Did Papias know John's gospel? It does not seem likely, in spite of Jülicher-Fascher (*Einleitung*, 396) that John provided the norm with which Mark was compared; but it is probable that he knew the gospel. He used I John. If the fragment ascribed to "the presbyters" in Irenaeus v. 36. 1-2 be his, as most critics have believed since Lightfoot (*Biblical Essays*, 67), he quoted the gospel from memory. He is interpreting symbolically the "hundredfold, sixtyfold, thirtyfold" crop of Matthew xiii. 23, in reference to three levels of reward in the Kingdom, and he clinches his discussion by a saying of the Lord. "In my Father's [house] are many mansions." Abbott claimed that "the elders" are "not quoting and misinterpreting John, but quoting and interpreting in accordance with (oral) tradition a Logion (illustrating the Synoptic Parable of the Sower) of which John gives a different version."⁵ Does he? Or is not this a pretty obvious case of memory quotation, confusing Lucan and Johannine usage? It is an interesting fact that a favorite Lucan usage is the neuter plural article followed by a genitive, meaning "affairs," "business," and several other things.⁶ In the case of Luke ii. 49, however, where the boy Jesus asks his parents why they failed to understand that he must be *ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς μου*, the reader would naturally understand "the temple," his Father's house. As Klostermann remarks (*Handbuch*, ed. 2, 1929) this is "local, like Gen. xli. 51, not equivalent to *in rebus patris* after the parallel in I Timothy iv. 15; it concerns only the question 'where.'" Similarly Lagrange cites Josephus, *Ant.* xvi. 302 and Menander, quoted in *C. Apionem* i. 118, and mentions two papyri from Moulton (*Tebtunis pap.* 12, line 3, and P. Oxy. 523)—in all of which the reference is local. So the Fathers interpret this verse.⁷ Origen remarks that with this

⁴ See J. Knox, *Marcion and the N.T.* (1942), 126 f.

⁵ *Enc. Bibl.* ii., s.v. "Gospels," par. 94; quoted by B. W. Bacon, *Fourth Gospel*, 59.

⁶ Harnack, *Lukas der Arzt*, 45.

⁷ Irenaeus, who in this part of Book V is following the traditions of the presbyters (Bousset, *Schulbetrieb*, 280), says (v. 25.2): *Ipse enim apostolus [Paul] ex sua persona diffinitive templum illud [at Jerusalem] dixit Dei.*

verse "we are armed against the godless heresies which say that the Creator is not the Father of Jesus Christ, nor the God of the Law, nor is the God of the Temple the Father of Jesus Christ. The Valentinians should be ashamed when they hear his voice saying, 'I ought to be in my Father's [house],' if they accept the remark" (as genuine).⁸ Cyril of Alexandria (in Catena) follows Origen. The Marcosians, according to Irenaeus (i. 20. 2), apparently passed over the minor point of location and simply said that "Him whom they did not know he announced to them as Father."

It would be natural for Papias to understand "my Father's house" as the temple, for had not Christ done the same? Papias recalls, and confuses, such sayings as John ii. 16 (cf. Mark xi. 17 and parallels) and xiv. 2. Even though some might think that God had left the temple before its destruction (Josephus, *War* vi. 299), others did not. "Even after the destruction of the temple, it was maintained by Eleazar ben Pedat that God's Presence (shekinah) still abode on the ruined site in accordance with his promise, 'My eyes and my mind will be there perpetually' [I Kings ix. 3]."⁹ Similarly to the Ebionites, conservative Christian Jews, it was still God's house. "They persevere in the Jewish mode of life to such a degree that they reverence Jerusalem as the house of God" (Irenaeus i. 26. 2). Even though according to one of Papias' favorite books there will be no temple in the heavenly Jerusalem (Rev. xxi. 22), other apocalyptic writers predicted that "a house shall be built for the Great King in glory forevermore" (I Enoch 91: 13; similarly Or. Sib. v. 423, II Baruch vi. 8). Furthermore, it is possible that Papias was a Jew. Bartlet remarks that his mind was not Hellenistic; and his name, though not distinctively Jewish,¹⁰ was borne by a Tannaite rabbi¹¹ and an obscure Jew in the ghetto of Hermopolis in Egypt.¹²

In this same fragment from Irenaeus, Papias makes use of Matthew. He is, of course, not alone in doing so; Matthew and I Corin-

⁸ Origen, *In Lucam Hom.* xx (GCS ix.1.131: 12 Rauer).

⁹ G. F. Moore, *Judaism*, i. 369.

¹⁰ Literary and epigraphic references by Hase in Stephanus-Dindorf, vi. 186; papyri in F. Preisigke, *Namenbuch* (1922), 276. See also W. H. P. Hatch in ZNW 12 (1911), 83.

¹¹ M. Jastrow, *Dictionary of the Targumim*, etc., 1204. I owe this suggestion to the Bishop of Quebec.

¹² C. Wessely in *Studien sur Palaeog. u. Papyrskunde* 13 (1913), 8 ff. (nos. 2, 7, 9, 11, 13).

thians are quoted by nearly every writer in the second century. But he is alone in giving information about its author. "So then Matthew compiled the oracles in the Hebrew language; but everyone interpreted them as he was able" (*H.E.* iii. 39. 17, Oulton). What this cryptic statement of Papias—not, apparently, the presbyter—means has been a matter of dispute for a long time. That it is incorrect is obvious from two facts: (a) the apostle Matthew would not have had to rely on the apostles' follower Mark, as this gospel does, and (b) it is obviously not a translation but an original Greek work. Perhaps, as Rendel Harris urged, Papias refers to a collection of oracles from the Old Testament, predictions of the Messiah. Burkitt favored this view. On the other hand, the word *λόγια* may mean sayings, as Donovan tried to prove. Certainty cannot be reached. We simply do not know what Matthew was supposed to have written. It seems likely that Papias, who knew the gospel, understood this statement in reference to it. Jerome's statement (*De Viris Illust.* 36) that Bartholomew's Hebrew copy of Matthew was brought back by Pantaenus from India is merely a deduction from two passages in Eusebius, and Eusebius' statement that Pantaenus saw one in India is legend. The most likely guess, it seems to me, is that Papias has confused Matthew with the Gospel of the Hebrews, both of which he knew. Jerome tells us that many people thought that "Hebrews" was the original of Matthew.¹³ Papias may have thought so too.¹⁴

Thus Papias probably knew our four gospels, as well as at least one more. This does not prove that he knew them as scripture, however, but simply that he read them and valued them highly. Canonicity, like a four-fold gospel, is a later development.

¹³ *Comm. in Matt.* xii. 13, In evangelio quo utuntur Nazaraeni et Ebionitae, quod nuper in Graecum de Hebraeo sermone transtulimus et quod vocatur a plerisque Matthaei authenticum. . . .

¹⁴ So Hilgenfeld interpreted Papias.

"GREEK IN JEWISH PALESTINE"

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Greek in Jewish Palestine. By Saul Lieberman. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1942, pp. ix + 207. \$3.00.

Dr. Lieberman states his general position as follows (p. 2): 'The Greek language was known to the Jewish masses: certain formulas of oriental Graeco-Roman law were popular among them in the original language: the current motifs of Hellenistic literature may have infiltrated into them, but real Greek culture was probably scarce in Jewish Palestine.' He supports this with a wealth of detailed observations from Talmud and Midrashim, and also from epitaphs. His quotations afford excellent vignettes of Palestinian life: e.g. p. 31 on the virtuous act of Pantokakos, a Jew employed in a theatre, and p. 68 ff., 'Gentiles and Semi-proselytes' (with noteworthy evidence for cordial relations, even when the Gentile was a Roman: kindness will out, and this is a corrective against the oversimplified views which we so easily form of cultures remote in time or space). P. 91 ff., 'Pleasures and Fears,' illustrates the temperate moderation of the Rabbinic attitude towards physical exercises of the Greek type, from which Philo and Paul alike draw similes, and towards popular superstitions.¹ P. 115 ff., 'Oaths and Vows,' is a valuable commentary on Matt. 5: 34-37; 23: 16-22 (Philo *Decal.* 92 shows the same eagerness to discourage unnecessary oaths. The references to oath 'by heaven and by earth' and the denial by Maimonides of the validity of swearing 'by heaven, by earth, by the

¹ Further reference might be made to the activity of Jews in magic (cf. *ib.* p. 15, n. 3, on a spell clearly composed by a Jew, and Nock, *Gnomon* XII, 1936, p. 607, n. 2, and W. L. Knox, *Harvard Theol. Rev.* XXXI, 1938, p. 91 ff.—but cf. now the remarks of Campbell Bonner, *ib.*, XXXVI, 1943, pp. 42 f.; also Nock in Jackson-Lake, *Beginnings of Christianity*, V. p. 182 f.), and to the (by no means unjustified) disapproval by the Rabbis of the contemporary theatre (Strack-Billerbeck, *Komm. N. T.*, IV, p. 401). Philo *Prov.* ii. 58 (IX, p. 496 Colson) speaks of incidents which he had witnessed at chariot races, probably as a personal recollection and not simply as a transcript from the Greek source which he is following; at least he states the fact without apology.

sun and by similar objects,' p. 137 f., should now be brought into connexion with the oath 'under Zeus, earth, the sun' in a society which must be deemed to be of Jewish origin in south Russia: ² cf. p. 124, and also the rhetorical invocation in Philo *Flacc.* 123). P. 144 ff., 'Greek and Latin Proverbs in Rabbinic Literature,' makes many clever rapprochements (e.g., p. 158 f., 'hang yourself on a big tree,' used without any concern for the sinfulness of suicide). Not all are secure: as Lieberman recognizes, traffic went both ways, and some proverbs in our Byzantine collections need not belong to pagan antiquity. Here, as with the fable, Christianization was natural and indeed inevitable; yet the Petronius parallels (p. 152 ff.) are striking and must be more than coincidence: Lieberman infers a common oriental source.³ P. 161 ff., 'Misunderstood Expressions and Words,' includes further points for cultural history.

On matters of detail we may disagree. Thus pp. 1, 20, in the statement about 500 young men studying the Law and 500 studying Greek wisdom in Patriarch Gamaliel's house, the numbers should not be taken literally.⁴ 'Wisdom' is a comprehensive word. Another text asserts that the Patriarch's family were allowed to learn Greek owing to their relation with the Roman government, which need not have involved more than the fluent precise use of the Greek language, possibly Gentile law, and perhaps nothing more was taught; certainly to speak of an officially recognized 'Academy of Greek Wisdom' is hardly safe; at least there is little evidence of its fruits. P. 29 f., the striking comparison made by Cleomedes (possibly following Posidonius) between the style of Epicurus and that of the *proseuchê* should not be pressed to mean 'the speech of the minor preachers.' Among the other analogies adduced by Cleomedes is the language of women at the Thesmophoria, which he as a man could not attend (any more than Juvenal, in spite of vi. 314 ff., had ever witnessed the ceremonies of the *Bona Dea*): is not the reference to the *proseuchê* simply a general ex-

² J.-B. Frey, *Corpus Inscr. Judaicarum*, I, p. 500 f., No. 690; Nock, *Conversion*, p. 63.

³ M. Hadas, *Am. Jour. Phil. L.* (1929), p. 378 ff., gives additional material in the light of which we need not hesitate to recognize Jewish and other near Eastern elements in Petronius. The Jew had a certain gift for pointed sayings. (Another paper by Hadas, *Philol. Quart.* VIII, 1929, p. 369 ff., on Roman allusions in Rabbinic literature, is well worth reading; e.g. pp. 372, 384 f., for occasional references to the justice and benevolence of the Empire).

⁴ As Canon W. L. Knox once observed to me.

pression of contempt such as might arise in some Syrian milieu in which Greek and Jew lived side by side? P. 99 f., Bardaisan's statement about the Jews, 'Nor does the star, which has authority in the Clime, govern them by force,' is not equivalent to the Rabbinic statement 'the predictions of the Astrologers have no effect on you, for you are Jews,'⁵ but means 'all Jews follow their Law, under whatever constellation and in whatever land each is born.' Similar references are made to the customs of Persians, Bactrians, etc.: it is the old Carneadean argument, that the peculiar customs of different nations disprove the whole theory of astral determinism.⁶ Bardaisan applied it to the sphere of moral action, for he did not deny Fate and its expression in the movement of the stars, as a divine operation, controlling the length of life and a man's wealth or poverty: in fact, he held that Fate, Nature and Free Will determined human life, and was concerned only to safeguard the last.⁷ P. 139 ff., on a story in which a courtesan in the coastal cities is said to have sworn 'by the *Gappa* of Rome,' accepts the equation of *Gappa* with *ἀγάπη* and quotes P. Oxy. 1380: 109 f. *ἡ Ἰταλὶα ἀ[γά]πην θεῶν* in the list of the titles of Isis in different lands. He refers to *Philia* as the epithet of Isis (l. 94) at Dora in Palestine, and urges that Isis was a natural goddess for the woman to invoke. This is very ingenious, but it is hard to see how she would know the cult-equation: in any event, B. A. van Groningen saw that the reading of the papyrus was probably incorrect, and G. von Manteuffel, on re-examining the original, found *α[γα]πὴν ἀθολὸν* i.e. *ἀγαθὴν ἀθολὸν* (*Rev. phil.* LIV, 1928, p. 163); as E. Peterson (*Bibl. Z.* XX, 1932, p. 378 ff.) remarked, the reference is to *Bona Dea*. Is not *Gappa* a textual error for *Gad* (Fortune, Tyche), which gives a common and natural oath?⁸

Lieberman's discussion of various loan-words in Rabbinic litera-

⁵ For this, cf. W. L. Knox in H. Loewe, *Judaism and Christianity*, II, p. 101 n.

⁶ Cf. M. L. W. Laistner, *Harv. Theol. Rev.* XXXIV (1941), p. 255 ff.

⁷ Cf. F. C. Burkitt, *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 177 ff., and for a limited Fate cf. Nock, *Sallustius*, p. lxx f. The redaction in Greek quoted by Euseb. *Praep. evang.* vi. 10. 14 speaks of Indians who, unlike the holy Brahmins who abstain from murder, idolatry, animal food and strong drink, do the opposite and in almost all things are carried along in accordance with Fate: i.e. they live in the world of material things (cf. J. Bidez-F. Cumont, *Les mages hellénisés*, II, p. 243 ff.), and do not use Free Will. But this phrase occurs neither in the Syriac original nor (as Professor W. Thomson remarked to me) in the Latin version in Clem. *Recog.* ix. 20, and, though consistent with the theory of the original, must be regarded as an expansion. (The question whether the original belongs to Bardaisan or to a disciple does not concern us here.)

⁸ This suggestion has been made by H. Lewy, *Z. D. Morgenl. Ges.* XLVII (1893) p. 118 (a reference which I owe to Dr. L. Finkelstein).

ture is noteworthy: the range of such borrowing and adaptation was very considerable, and he argues forcibly that the Greek words in sermons were not simply meant to attract attention or to display knowledge (p. 38 ff.), and that many of them had passed into popular language: ⁹ it might be interesting to compare this phenomenon in detail with the acceptance of Latin words and Latinisms in popular Greek of the Near East. How widely Greek sentences were understood is another matter; and so is the influence of Greek thought on the higher level.

May we hope that Lieberman will give us something on this topic also? In the meanwhile Strack-Billerbeck IV, p. 405 f., and Rudolf Meyer, *Hellenistisches in der rabbinischen Anthropologie*, furnish useful evidence for a qualitative dualism of body and soul, for the notion of the descent of the soul into the body, for a homiletical adaptation of the myth of Er, and for the theory of elements. *Bereshit Rabbah* compares the Creator with a king employing an architect—who in his turn uses plans, counters alien or dangerous views on cosmogony, and uses Greek words (G. F. Moore, *Judaism*, I, p. 165); but how utterly different it is from Philo's interpretation of Genesis in *De opificio mundi*! The truth is, I think, that Philo and his like were exceptional, even in their time and place, in their desire to find the Law intelligible and reasonable. Philo did not doubt the absolute power of God to alter the order of nature,¹⁰ and the binding authority of every divine command, ceremonial as well as ethical: but he felt an inner compulsion to see divine actions and commands as reasonable, and to represent obedience to the Mosaic Law as being the way of living the ideal life and reaching the highest potentialities of man under grace.¹¹ Josephus adopts a similar attitude for apologetic purposes.¹² But we may doubt

⁹ Since some of the Greek words discussed by Lieberman are extremely rare, it may be well to refer to S. Krauss, *Byz. Zeit* II (1893) p. 496 on the coinage of Greek words in Palestine.

¹⁰ Cf. H. A. Wolfson, *Harv. Theol. Rev.* XXXV (1942), p. 138 ff.; Galen *De usu partium* xi. 14.

¹¹ Cf. G. F. Moore, *Judaism*, I, p. 214; II, p. 5 ff.; III, p. 141 f.; J. S. Boughton, *The Idea of Progress in Philo Judaeus*. (It should be noted that Philo finds an element of divine assistance in human reasoning on religion; cf. I. Heinemann, *Pauly-Wissowa*, V A 2325.)

¹² Cf. in particular what look like echoes of Philo in *Ant. Jud.* i. 18 ff. and 24 (tr. Thackeray), 'nothing will appear to them unreasonable, nothing incongruous with the majesty of God and His love for men': also i. 192 on circumcision with the

whether most native Judaism, whether Greek-speaking or not, Palestinian or Alexandrine, reflective or popular, had any great use for Greek philosophy except as affording illustrative material. That is, after all, the character of Wisdom, as Fr. Focke showed in his *Die Entstehung der Weisheit Salomos*. To read the Bible in Greek and to state your beliefs in that language involved certain changes in emphasis and connotation, but there was a fundamental unity of sentiment. St. Paul, after all his experience as Apostle to the Gentiles, remained nearer to the Palestinian tradition than to Philo: and so, I suspect, did most Judaism of the Dispersion.

After St. Paul's time, there came the Jewish counter-reformation, with its new safeguards against what it deemed apostasy and the perversion of God's revelation in Scripture. This movement and the circumstances of the time involved an additional hardening; but it was not primarily a reaction against Hellenism, and there continued to be contacts such as Lieberman has so well illustrated.

comment of I. Heinemann, *Review of Religion*, IV, (1940), p. 397, in an article very well worth reading (e.g. cf. 388, 'Rabbinic literature, which mentions no philosopher of the schools by name, but has learned of the Diatribe').

"MARCION AND THE NEW TESTAMENT"

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Marcion and the New Testament. By John Knox. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942, pp. x + 195. \$2.00.

His friends have known that for several years Professor Knox has been interested in the Marcionite problem, and here in a brilliant and ingenious book are the results of his studies. He begins with a survey of what is known of Marcion's thought, accepting Harrison's theory that Polycarp wrote two letters to the Philippians, one of them directed against the great heretic. The second chapter, "Marcion and the Idea of the New Testament," develops Harnack's judgment that Marcion set forth the first Christian canon and so forced the Catholic Church to make its own. This part of the book is now the best treatment of this theme of which we know.

In Chapter III, "Marcion's 'Apostle' and the Pauline Corpus," the author brings together interesting material, much of which he has previously published, on the original order of the Pauline collection—to which he believes Marcion bears witness—including a demonstration that the salutations of Second Corinthians and Second Thessalonians are the work of a later editor. In the earliest *corpus* the correspondence to Corinth was treated as a single unit, so was that addressed to Thessalonica. When this is understood, it can be seen that the original collector arranged the epistles in the order of length, except that Ephesians, the covering encyclical, preceded the rest. While conceding that Marcion omitted parts of the epistles, e.g. Rom. 4: 1-25, Dr. Knox contends that omission of Rom. 15-16 cannot be explained merely by Marcion's doctrinal tastes.

The rest of the book is still more controversial. Chapter IV, "Marcion's 'Gospel' and the Gospel of Luke," begins by reviewing literature on the Marcionite gospel from Semler (1783) on down. The famous German controversy of the mid-nineteenth century ended with general denial that Luke was derived from Marcion's gospel or that the latter stemmed from the canonical Luke. English-speaking

scholars have generally followed Sanday's decision that Marcion revised our Luke, and Harnack came to the same conclusion in his influential *Marcion: das Evangelium vom fremden Gott* (Leipzig, 1921), p. 221*f., "No more words need be wasted to show that Marcion's gospel is merely what the ancient church's judgment maintained it was, namely a falsified Luke." Professor Knox now undertakes to upset our complacency on this point. Luke is analyzed into A sections, known to have existed in Marcion's evangel; B sections, known not to have been in it; and C sections, for which there is no evidence of inclusion or exclusion. He then argues that much of C may have been included by Marcion, and that not all of the B omissions can be explained by his peculiar doctrines, though, as he freely admits, Marcion undoubtedly did remove some passages which were distasteful to him. A linguistic study is made to establish the negative point that word-counting will not confirm or refute the traditional theory. Dr. Knox refers to Professor F. C. Grant's article, "Was the Author of John Dependent upon the Gospel of Luke?" *Jour. of Bibl. Lit.* LVI (1937) 285-307, to show that the Fourth Gospel, itself a late document, need not be dependent on our Luke at all, but on a source or an earlier stage of it; and it is further contended that some of the interests which Cadbury notes as specifically Lucan are either lacking in the A and C sections or much reduced. Lucan niceties of language are often absent in Marcion, e.g. we read *κράββατος* instead of *κλινίδιον*.

Professor Knox states his conclusions with such tentativeness and scientific reserve that it is difficult to argue with him; yet he clearly believes that Marcion took over and edited a form of Luke more primitive than our own, though more advanced in some ways than Streeter's Proto-Luke in that it contains many Marcan elements. Our Luke, on the other hand, is a product of the anti-Marcionite struggle. Chapter V develops another conclusion, viz. that the finished work Luke-Acts is in itself a complete Catholic "gospel-apostle," produced in opposition to the Marcionite canon, and bringing St. Paul into harmony with the Twelve. There is no clear trace of Acts before 150 but it is "suddenly available" about that time to those who are making up a canon. The author's apparent ignorance of the Pauline epistles is disposed of by arguments similar to those of Enslin. All of the really significant passages by which Krenkel sought to establish a dependence of Luke-Acts on Josephus, says Knox, belong to either the B sections of Luke

or to Acts. The prologue, Luke 1: 1-4, which is really a preface to the two volume work as a whole, would suit an anti-Marcionite purpose. Chapter VI sets for a complete theory of the growth of the canon; the fourfold gospel was made in Rome about 150-175 (cf. R. M. Grant, "The Fourth Gospel and the Church," *Harvard Theol. Rev.* XXXV [1942] 95-116, on this point), thus at the time when the Pastorals are added to the Pauline corpus, and for the same reason. The final chapter recapitulates Knox's conclusions.

Dr. Knox's theory of the original order of the Pauline epistles (Eph. and Cor. on one roll, Rom., Thess., Gal., Col. and Phm., Phil. on a second) is intriguing, and deserves some brief comment. He suggests that the order in the Muratorian fragment (Cor. and Eph. first, Rom. last) is simply the original order in reverse; this seems possible. He might have added that Origen and apparently Cyprian had a somewhat similar order—see K. and S. Lake, *An Introduction to the N. T.* (New York, 1937), p. 97 f.—while Tertullian's is *almost* Marcion's in reverse! Nor does he mention the order of the Chester Beatty papyrus, our oldest extant Pauline MS. This begins with Romans and has the epistles in almost perfect order of length, except that Hebrews is put after Romans and before First Corinthians, because it obviously cannot be placed between First and Second Corinthians. The difference is that in this reckoning the Corinthian and Thessalonian epistles are treated as four letters, not two. The circumstance that this is another arrangement in order of length strengthens the hypothesis that the original arrangement was on such a basis.

Professor Knox would not claim to have *proved* his Luke-Acts theory; the most he would say is that it seems more likely than the hitherto prevailing view. Is it? At least we can say that, from now on, no one is likely to repeat the judgments of Harnack and Sanday with dogmatic confidence. The strengths—and difficulties—of this new reconstruction appear in their completeness only when one collates Harnack's reconstruction with the Greek New Testament. Then it is seen that several points favor the theory. Chapters 1-2 are so independent that it is easy to suppose that they formed no part of the original gospel. The beginning of Marcion's gospel (3: 1a; 4: 31-35; part of the pericope 4: 16-30) is plausible. Marcion had only the name "Pilate," not "Pontius;" in knowing the name "Pontius Pilate" the ecclesiastical Luke and I Tim. 6: 13 stand alone in the New Testa-

ment. The elaborate synchronism in Luke 3 could, like the prologues, be later than the rest of the gospel (cf. R. M. Grant, *HTR* XXXIII [1940] 150-154). As for 5: 39, which Marcion omitted (with D, some old Latin MSS. and apparently Eusebius), Harnack thinks he deleted it for dogmatic reasons; but I should be glad to regard it as an anti-Marcionite addition. Some of the "omissions" are difficult to account for. I am inclined to accept Harnack's judgment that the story of the Prodigal Son (*Marcion*, p. 19) and some of the eschatological sayings were abhorrent to Marcion—one must read Harnack to appreciate this subtle and intelligent heresy—but what is to be said of the stories of the Good Samaritan and Martha and Mary? Other puzzling omissions are 18: 31-34; 23: 39-43.

But why is it desirable to suppose that the shorter exemplar which Marcion adopted was more primitive than that gospel which contained the preaching of John the Baptist and the story of the Prodigal Son? If Luke went through several stages in the hands of the same author, or if it was epitomized by someone, a briefer form could have circulated in Pontus. Abbreviated documents did circulate; for example, some MSS. of Romans did not have chapters 15-16, yet chapter 15 is clearly by Paul and addressed to the Romans. Marcion had some of the gifts of the literary critic and he wrongly supposed that only the briefer form of Romans was genuine; perhaps his judgment about Luke is a similar error.

Again, it does not seem credible to me that some of the primitive sources in Acts, or material on the preaching of John the Baptist, or some of the stories in Luke 1-2 (likewise dealing with the Baptist), could suddenly have turned up in the middle of the second century. The apocryphal gospels, epistles and acts which begin to emerge by 150-175 are of a very different sort. If a Proto-Luke was expanded into a longer book, it would happen most naturally in the first century, by 100 at the latest; this, however, does not render impossible some later touching up, especially the addition of the prologues, the synchronism, 5: 39; 9: 31, etc. Likewise, while Luke's genealogy is easily separable from the gospel, it presupposes a relatively early date and some contact with the Jewish side of Christianity. If a genealogy were to be added very late, why would not Matthew's form be used?

Knox calls attention to the fact that in 5: 24 Marcion's Luke has the Marcan *κράββατος* instead of *κλινίδιον*. Similar phenomena, suggest-

ing a more primitive and vulgar form, are to be found throughout the gospel. Harnack believes that these readings have no significance, since most of them are simply western readings, frequent in D and the old Latin. (It may be added that many of Marcion's readings, as given by Harnack, later turn up in the Byzantine text.) Frequently these western and Marcionite readings conform the text of Luke to Matthew and Mark. Knox points out that this does not necessarily mean that Marcion got his textual tradition from Rome; "western" merely means "unrevised local texts," and in his second edition Harnack admitted that Marcion may have obtained his text in the east. But this does not solve the problem whether the western and Marcionite text is in these passages more or less original than our neutral text. There are three possibilities, (a) that Marcion's recension is actually earlier and for that reason closer to the readings of Mark and Q, (b) that Marcion's Luke was already affected by the "wild western" tendency, and (c) that Tertullian and others unconsciously corrupted their evidence in a western direction. Now, if the textual peculiarities are to be accounted for on Knox's theory, an ecclesiastical recension of Luke-Acts was made in the second century, but it was very soon affected by the text of Luke's older form, and Acts also underwent a great deal of textual change almost immediately. This is, of course, not impossible. On the other hand, a simpler explanation is possible if Luke-Acts, substantially in its present form, was completed about the year 100. In both east and west, the text of Luke was much affected by Matthew and Mark, and it was manuscripts of this type that Marcion utilized. Even if Marcion made use of a shorter recension of Luke, it may have undergone such textual change. I hope that some textual critic will tell us whether western readings in the non-Marcionite parts of Luke (there are 57½ verses in B with synoptic parallels) show the same tendency to conform Luke to Mark and Matthew. Unless we can accept Knox's theory, the textual phenomena may indicate a wide currency of Matthew and Mark in the early second century.

The next point is not strictly contrary to Knox's theory, but tends to render it more difficult. Even if one should leave out all the C passages, which he by no means wishes to do, Marcion's Luke is a highly developed document. It contains material from Mark and Q and some of the special material which we often call L. It has both the

sending of the twelve and of the seventy (or seventy-two). Its form of chapter 17 contains v. 25, which may be secondary, and v. 32, which surely is. Its doom chapter (21) is based on Mark 13. In the Last Supper pericope (22: 17-20) there is no evidence for v. 17 f. (the first cup) and Harnack thinks this was probably omitted. Nor is there evidence of v. 19b ("this do in my remembrance"), but v. 20 is included (without *καὶ αὐτὴ*, with Mark—for Marcion there was but one covenant); thus Marcion has the order bread—cup. However, this evidence is capable of more than one interpretation. Luke 24:12, listed by F. C. Grant in his article cited above as a gloss from John, is absent from Marcion's Luke. There are some echoes of 24: 13-21a, but no evidence of vv. 21b-24, and Grant thinks vv. 22-24 are an interpolation. Moreover, there is no evidence of vv. 27-29, 32-36, and vv. 37-43 would hook up fairly well with vv. 25 f., 30 f. On the other hand, Grant argues that vv. 44-49 are in good Lucan style, but we have evidence of the presence in Marcion's document of v. 47 only. Grant shows that vv. 37, 39-43 are glosses, derived almost exclusively from John 20-21, *but Marcion has every one of them!*

Another point may not be persuasive but also raises questions. Goodspeed, *New Solutions of New Testament Problems* (Chicago, 1927), pp. 82-84, lists 35 particulars in which there are resemblances between Luke and Torrey's "First Acts" (1: 1-15: 35). An analysis shows that eight of these resemblances extend also to Marcion's Luke, five are to be found in it though to a lesser degree, eight more are probably present though we cannot be sure, in four cases we cannot tell, while ten of the characteristics are not found in the Marcionite evangel.

This reviewer cannot claim to have done sufficient spade-work to speak with authority in answering Professor Knox, but he does maintain that these points should be considered before one accepts a view of Luke-Acts so similar to that of the Tübingen school.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Bible Is Human. By Louis Wallis. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942, pp. xi + 303. \$2.50.

In *The Bible Is Human*, Louis Wallis has created as daring a book in the field of Hebrew history as the title suggests. Although it provides a lively survey of history in Palestine from pre-Hebrew Canaan to the captivity of Judah in 586 B. C., it is much more than the reviewing of a succession of events. It is concerned with "the view that religion arises within the commonplace terms of life." It maintains that the Bible, as now constituted, is confusing on this point. To develop this view, the author differentiates between the record of the gradual growth of the idea of monotheism as indicated by the source materials of *secular* Hebrew history, and "Bible history," which is the source material augmented by the interpretations and interpolations of the later compilers, who used their sources with a theological bias and to promote concepts of religious orthodoxy prevalent in the various periods of Biblical compilation. Such theological interpretation has made "God uninteresting" and "extrinsic to human history," and religion "a deposit of supernatural doctrine," according to the author. This is the natural third volume of the trilogy, begun in *Sociological Study of the Bible* and continued in *God and the Social Process*. Its own theology is the normal accompaniment of social understanding—significantly prophetic, for "it contemplates both God and man as factors energizing the onward flow of history."

The pages devoted to tracing Hebrew history are good reading; the vocabulary fresh, the action brisk. The usual Wallis source-theory of the priority of the "E" documents and the prominence of the Josephite tribes and traditions are, of course, recognizable in their reiteration in this volume. Wallis, however, does not neglect Judah. David's rise to power is reported with the vividness of an important biography of a dictator today. Familiar to readers of *God and the Social Process* is the interpretation of "mishpat," for which the prophets contended, as that fundamental of social justice which involved the guarantee to each Hebrew of his inalienable right to possess his freehold in "the land of his fathers" as a necessary source of a living,—a protection to his person and family against being forced into slavery in times of duress. The story of this struggle of the common man and his prophetic protagonist against the power politics of court and monied interests gives the book current value, not only to readers in the fields of Biblical problems and economic history, but to the general reader concerned with present discussions of freedoms of person and property, the State, regimentation, and the relation of religion to them.

So positive a pronouncement of views as that of Wallis is certain to arouse disagreement. His repeated emphasis on the "E" source and the Ephraimitic contribution to Hebrew history, and his opinions regarding orthodoxy and theology, are open to wide debate.

The structural unity of the book, as well as its religious climax, seems to the reviewer to have been weakened unfortunately by the inclusion of unimportant appendices. The book actually reaches its powerful conclusion on page 242 in these words:

And the Cross becomes the symbol of a spiritual process which welds the conception of God into the heart of the struggle for a better world, whose broadening

perspective includes the regeneration of the individual, the salvation of society, and a faith in Eternity which gives worth to the problems of time.

JEAN H. JOHNSON.

Cambridge, Mass.

Coptic Texts in the University of Michigan Collection. Edited by William H. Worrell, in collaboration with five students and associates. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1942, pp. 375, pls. 11. \$5.00.

It was Flinders Petrie who introduced into modern archaeological science the principle of the importance of little things. It is well, therefore, that institutions possessing collections of ancient written material should see to it that the material be studied and published as soon as possible, no matter how fragmentary. Professor Worrell and his associates have done well in giving to the world this collection of texts, and although a large part of it is fragmentary, but none the less important, there are larger texts of liturgical material, homilies, martyrdoms, magic, and general secular literature, among which are many interesting letters. The great majority of the texts are Sahidic, and they cover the entire Coptic period.

Of chief importance to students of religion and the Bible are the sixty-three Biblical texts, several of which are quite extensive and of great interest. This is particularly true of the text of Ecclesiastes, which fills in much of that portion of the book which was hitherto missing, namely, chapters 9: 4-10: 3. There are also important fragments of Genesis, Ruth, Song of Songs, Jeremiah, and Baruch. Here we have a collection of invaluable material for use in work on the text of the Old Testament.

For the specialist in language, as well as for all interested in the way in which a language, which served a mighty race for more than three thousand years, finally weakened and gave way before a more virile form of speech, the able chapter by Worrell on "Popular traditions of the Coptic language" makes most interesting reading, full as it is with the evidence of change and decay in things which once seemed eternal and changeless.

The book is for specialists; but it contains much which would charm and stimulate any educated person.

SAMUEL A. B. MERCER.

Trinity College, Toronto

Philo, With an English Translation. (Loeb Classical Library.) Vol. ix. By F. H. Colson. Harvard University Press, 1942, pp. x + 547. \$2.50.

This is the next to last volume of the Loeb *Philo* and it contains the following treatises: Every Good Man is Free; On the Contemplative Life; On the Eternity of the World; Flaccus; Hypothetica; and On Providence. The final volume, 10, will contain, presumably, the Legation to Gaius and the fragments, presumably also a good index.

Colson's edition takes for granted the text of Cohn and Reiter, but the translator and editor does not hesitate to adopt new and better readings when he thinks them original. In one case in this present volume, Mr. Colson offers a new and most probable reading based upon textual emendation—though no one ancient manuscript contains this reading.

As in the earlier volumes, the translation is clear and readable. That Philonic studies have survived the older editions and translations of Philo gives us ground for hope that they will greatly revive as a result of this new translation. Of course,

Philo is indispensable to the student of New Testament and of early Christian doctrine, not (as some have thought) because St. Paul had made a careful study of the writings of Philo but just because Philo represents that confluence of Jewish and Hellenistic thought which could have taken place nowhere else as it did in Alexandria; and because it was not long after Philo that the church stood at the same point of convergence, faced many of the same problems (particularly the exegesis of the Old Testament), shared much of the same philosophical outlook, particularly the doctrine of the Logos, and arrived at many of the same solutions. Philo's influence upon Clement of Alexandria and upon Origen is indisputable. If he did not influence St. Paul or St. John, he nevertheless reflects a common background which every thoughtful Greek-speaking religious man inevitably shared in the first century. With the new Loeb translation at his elbow and Professor Goodenough's little *Introduction to Philo Judaeus* open before him, the present-day New Testament student will find a whole new realm swinging into his range of vision.

FREDERICK C. GRANT.

Union Theological Seminary

Constantine the Great. By Lloyd B. Holsapple. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942, pp. xx + 475. \$3.00.

This is an exceptionally fine book about Constantine. It is thorough and well-informed both in the primary and secondary sources, fair and non-apologetic in its appraisals, and unusually lucid and interesting in its presentation. It does not offer any new theories, but does attempt a just evaluation of the literature of the period, both ancient and modern. More stress is laid upon the political and religious aspects of Constantine's age than upon the social and economic. This represents the author's well-considered judgment that Constantine's own character and work are best understood around the pivot of his conversion to Christianity. The interest of the book for the general reader is heightened by the attention given to the legendary elements in Constantine's fame, notably the famous "Donation," and how such conceptions arose.

Though due emphasis is placed upon the inadequacy of Constantine's conception of Christianity, the author, quite rightly, I think, insists upon the sincerity of his attachment to and identification with the Catholic Church. He accepts the Eusebian story of the conversion without deciding for or against the subjective or objective character of the heavenly sign. The author maintains that Constantine was a very religious man, even inclining to superstition; in no case was he a skeptic or an easy-going monotheist. The limitations of his view of Christianity as "a religion based on bargaining and confirmed by success," and as "a power that can and will bring about unity," were due not only to his heritage and environment, but to the influence of his closest Christian advisors—Lactantius and the two Eusebii. Constantine's humanity and generosity—with "a certain unworldliness and freedom from subtlety which deprived him of sharp discernment and of acute discrimination in his judgment of other men"—is set against the exaggerated charges of many scholars of his cruelty and tyrannical disposition.

"There was a real Constantine, a virile and energetic man, who retained to the end of his life some of his pagan manners; governed, sometimes by expediency, but generally by definite principles, which were at times more likely to be religious than political; able, astute, but withal never free from human weakness. He did possess to some degree each of the virtues which Eusebius ascribes to him" (p. 421).

The author believes that Constantine's greatness lay in his recognition and vision of a religious unity of the Empire—and thus, of Europe—without which it could not,

and cannot now "withstand the recurring onsets of barbarism." Yet many of the results of his policies were baneful. The following sentence, regarding his policy towards the Donatists, is most suggestive: "Constantine made a fundamental error in departing from the traditional appeal to Rome to substitute for it the authority of a council constituted by himself, and then in attempting to pronounce judgment himself when the decisions of his council proved ineffective" (p. 211). The author has not over-played, however, the theme of Roman primacy. Yet he has not elucidated just what it meant in the Church by the early fourth century.

A few minor criticisms of detail may be offered. There are two misstatements of fact. On p. 56 Valerian is said to have adjudicated the dispute over property arising from the condemnation of Paul of Samosata. This verdict is correctly ascribed to Aurelian on p. 257. On p. 357 the date of Otto III should be the tenth, not the twelfth century. The general reader may be a bit mystified by the references to the Novatians, Sabellians, etc., without sufficient discussion being given of the theological antecedents of the Nicene Council. There is also some foreshortening of the events immediately leading up to the Council of Nicæa; so that a later reference (p. 431) to the condemnation of Arius at Antioch and the proposed council of Ancyra is introduced without explanation. In a work which so admirably weaves its way through many complicated historical problems, it is to be regretted that more attention was not given to the much-debated questions over the sources of these pre-Nicene maneuvers.

There are brief notes to literature, a map and an index of proper names appended at the end.

MASSEY H. SHEPHERD, JR.

Episcopal Theological School

John Ponet (1516?-1556) Advocate of Limited Monarchy. By Winthrop S. Hudson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942, pp. ix + 246 + 183. \$4.50.

This is a careful and capable account of the life and writings of John Ponet, with especial attention to his political theory.

Ponet received his M.A. at Cambridge in 1535 and was ordained priest the next year. At the beginning of the reign of Edward VI he became one of Archbishop Cranmer's chaplains. Dr. Hudson conjectures that in this capacity he greatly assisted the Archbishop in his literary labors, indeed to such an extent that he was really the author of Cranmer's reply to Gardiner on the Sacrament. The reasons given for this conclusion seem tenuous to the reviewer. However, Ponet was an author of some distinction in his own right. Notable were his *A Defense for Mariage of Priestes* and *A Shorte Treatise of Politike Power*.

In 1550 he became Bishop of Rochester and when Gardiner was deprived of Winchester in 1551, was translated to that see. He held it till Gardiner's restoration under Queen Mary in 1553, when he fled to the Continent. He died in exile at Strassburg three years later. His *Shorte Treatise* was completed shortly before his death.

In this he maintained that the sovereign was subject to the laws, and if he attempted to override them he was to be restrained by the representatives of the people. If they could not or would not do so, there remained to the people the right of rebellion and tyrannicide. These ideas were not new; they had been held by medieval and classical writers; but they were novel in the middle of the sixteenth century, when the prevailing political and religious view was that the sovereign, as the Lord's

anointed, was the unlimited source of law: the duty of the subject was to obey or, if that were contrary to conscience or the Word of God, to suffer the penalty as a divine visitation for sin.

Ponet's book was reprinted twice on the eve of the Great Rebellion and one of the fathers of the American Revolution, John Adams, declared that it contained "all the essential principles of liberty."

After an admirable discussion of Ponet's ideas, their sources and their subsequent influence, the first edition of the *Shorte Treatise* is reproduced in facsimile (183 pages).

The whole is a solid contribution to Tudor church history as well as to the history of political thought.

J. A. MULLER

Episcopal Theological School

Coleridge and the Broad Church Movement. By Charles Richard Sanders. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1942, pp. viii + 307. \$3.50.

The title of this book is somewhat misleading, since we find here little that bears directly upon the Broad Church "movement" as such, beyond an attempt to define that rather fugitive group (or perhaps better, *attitude*). It is really a study, by an enthusiastic Coleridgean, of the religious philosophy which the sage of Highgate wrought out through doubt and struggle, and of his fructifying influence upon a few of his great younger contemporaries—liberals all, in their several ways. Arnold of Rugby, while hardly a disciple of Coleridge, admired him greatly ("With all his faults, old Sam was more of a great man than any who has lived within the four seas in my memory") and followed him with discrimination. On the whole, however, Arnold was a parallel and reinforcing influence. The scholarly Julius Charles Hare—he deserves to be more widely known than he is—perhaps understood Coleridge more thoroughly and interpreted him more adequately than any other. His pen was ever occupied in his hero's defense. Of Coleridge he said: "To him the mind of our generation . . . owes more than to any other man." In Maurice, that man of extraordinary gifts and originality who shuddered at being identified with Broad Church or any other "party," we have what Sanders calls a "major outlet" of Coleridgean ideas and attitudes. Strange figure in this company of Anglican parsons is Thomas Carlyle, on occasions bitingly scornful of Coleridge and doubtless jealous of his prestige, yet having much in common with him. "Carlyle might have been a happier man if there had never been a Coleridge," remarks the author—but one may wonder whether anything could have made the burry Scot a happy mortal.

The dominant characteristic of the group is not any idea or set of ideas, but devotion to truth—and this is the essence of authentic liberalism. Carlyle apart, they were lovers of the Church of England and longed to see her more spacious and more free. All would have assented to Coleridge's pregnant words in *Aids to Reflection*: "He who begins by loving Christianity better than truth, will proceed by loving his own sect or church better than Christianity, and end in loving himself best of all."

This is a very able piece of work by one who has read widely and sampled wisely among the early Victorians. To a large extent the five men considered are allowed to speak to us in their own language. The author is a member of the Department of English at Duke University.

P. V. NORWOOD.

Seabury-Western Theological Seminary

Ascent to Zion. By S. Arthur Devan. New York: Macmillan, 1942, pp. xiv + 251. \$2.50.

There can be no hesitation in placing Dr. Devan's work among the major books on worship which has appeared to date in America. It has the wisdom and insight of a thoughtful student and diligent pastor; and it also has the passion and courage of a reformer. It is little less than a clarion call "for a speedy and drastic reformation in the worship of American Protestantism." One senses, too, that Dr. Devan speaks this call with authority. Episcopalians will find almost every word of it applicable to themselves, though the author does not address himself specifically to those of a liturgical tradition. His book should give us pause, perhaps, when we consider how little we are doing for liturgical revival in American Christianity, to note that this latest contribution to Christian worship is by a Baptist, and a busy one at that—the Director of the General Commission on Army and Navy Chaplains.

Dr. Devan draws his main inspiration from the works of such Protestant scholars as Hislop, Heiler and Maxwell. There is a fair proportion of discussion given to theory, history, form, setting, and practice of worship, in all of which there is a fine balance between the tensions of objective-subjective, social-personal, fixed-free, prophetic-priestly. The presentation is extraordinarily fluent and apt in illustration, at times exhilarating, more often eloquent. The chapter on religious education for worship is particularly sane and straightforward; and this, with the chapter on the minister of worship, every clergyman would do well to read, mark, learn and inwardly digest. The final pages are deeply moving. He says,

What word has the Christian Church to offer in such a time as this? Such is our own spiritual impoverishment that we of the churches are sometimes downcast, thinking how little we have to offer. We feel like the man in the Gospel—"A friend of mine is come to me in a journey and I have nothing to set before him."

Yet we need not feel so, for with us is prayer. We can go to our Divine Friend even at midnight, with our request, "Lend me three loaves." Our prayer will be granted. We can come back with Faith and Hope and Love, enough to feed a humanity sorely destitute of these things, and after the midnight of these years there may yet come the dawn of a new day and breakfast for all mankind (pp. 239-40).

The following criticisms of detail are given only because the author in humility seeks them. There are a few errors of fact in the chapter on history of worship. The problems of the Kiddush and of the Agape are over-simplified; the latter did not disappear in the second century. There is no evidence of the use of a confession of faith, approaching creedal form, or of the Lord's Prayer at the Eucharist in Ante-Nicene times (as stated, pp. 57, 62); and the statement that the Sanctus was sung "in the midst of a spoken prayer" of Consecration is curious (p. 61). It would be better to say that the Liturgy of St. Chrysostom is "the normal use in Eastern Orthodox churches" today rather than the Liturgy of St. Basil (p. 64). More seriously, I fear Dr. Devan has not understood with sufficient appreciation the historical and doctrinal significance of the objective sacrifice of the Eucharist. This is due partly to his view of the slight influence to the Hebrew temple cultus upon Christian thinking, partly to his side-stepping of the relation between the Last Supper and our Lord's words there to Calvary, and partly, also, to his—quite justifiable—horror of the medieval corruption of sacrifice. On the other hand he does give due weight to the subjective-sacrificial element (called "self-donation") in the Eucharist, along with its conceptions of Memorial, Fellowship, Thanksgiving, Means of Grace, and Presence. In all, his Eucharistic theology seeks comprehensiveness and is irenic in spirit.

His two chapters on architecture and music seem to me less satisfactory than the other discussions. In the former he shows fine taste and offers many very important suggestions of practical import; but he has not entirely rid himself of the notion that Gothic and stone are the style and material of church building *par excellence*. He seems a bit timid before the development of new modernistic styles. In the chapter on music, I would take strong exception to his minimizing the importance of the texts sung in worship for fear lest the art of music be used for didactic purposes. The teaching of the sung Word is one of the basic criteria for judging whether church music be good or bad. Dr. Devan, I think, over-emphasizes the purely emotional values of music. We must sing with the spirit, yes, but must we not also sing with the understanding? He has not given us in this chapter a sufficient discussion of standards. I am somewhat amazed, too, that he should reiterate the word "monotonous" as descriptive of plainsong. When he lists Hopkins, Barnby, Sullivan and Stainer as representing nineteenth century Anglican music—apparently at its best—we must blush with shame. Incidentally, Byrd belongs to the sixteenth century composers, not the eighteenth (as stated p. 173).

All these are minor points. The book is well worthy of a hearty and generous reception. It is never academic, as books on worship so often tend to be. Yet its merit is not so much in the excellent practicality of its suggestions as in its positive religious convictions.

MASSEY H. SHEPHERD, JR.

Episcopal Theological School

Redemption and Revelation in the Actuality of History. By H. Wheeler Robinson. New York: Harpers, 1942, pp. xlviii + 320. \$3.00.

This ambitious volume is regarded by its author as the third of a "trilogy," the other two works being *The Christian Doctrine of Man* (1911) and *The Christian Experience of The Holy Spirit* (1928). Like the latter of these two, *Redemption and Revelation* is in the well known Library of Constructive Theology edited by Dean W. R. Matthews and Principal Robinson himself.

The special emphasis of the work in the author's view is brought out in the phrase "The Actuality of History." Part I, which bears this title, follows an introductory essay on "The Meaning of History." In Part II Revelation is treated, with the accent on the principle of mediation and with the provision of a thorough discussion of various media. Part III is devoted to Redemption including The Person and Work of the Redeemer as well as the life of the redeemed here and hereafter.

Redemption and Revelation has both the excellences and defects of Principal Robinson's other books. Because of the scale of this work and the time in which we live, both aspects are thrown into bolder relief. One of the strong features is the use made of the Old Testament and the immense knowledge which seems to underlie it. There is a very definite homiletic value in the book because of the wide range of material worked into the various discussions and the numerous and varied illustrations given. This very quality contributes, on the other hand, to a certain eclecticism and lack of conclusiveness which the work as a whole gives. There is also a certain repetitiousness which, unlike the repetition of a skillful dialectician, does not seem particularly to advance the argument. The position is clear-cut and the author must be credited with having the courage of his convictions. He is in the Liberal Protestant, experientialist tradition—the line that runs from Schleiermacher to Ritschl to Harnack, with William James emerging at some point. The value philosophy is

drawn on in an English rather than a German manner. The lack of emphasis on the Church is in striking contrast to the position of such younger Nonconformist theologians as Whale and Dodd. It is the more notable in view of the recognition so largely given to the mediation principle.

This brings us to the really fundamental criticism to be made of *Redemption and Revelation*. Purporting to expound these great twin doctrines in the context of the actuality of history, the author devotes himself dominantly to religious experience, its psychology and philosophy. The history of Israel, even, and prophetic religion are treated experientially rather than sociologically and organically. The result is that the discussion of history and the Christian interpretation of it are abstract and wishful. What is needed surely for a convincing philosophy of history from a Christian angle is more sense of the *isness* of history. History means Society and a succession of cultures as well as the sum total of experient individual subjects. Here, of course, is one of the really big present issues in theology as well as in philosophy.

In conclusion, let me emphasize the thoroughness, candor, and constructive purpose of Principal Robinson's work. If it wants something of the fire and imperative of classical evangelicalism, it is nonetheless evangelical in spirit. The reader who is seeking a comprehensive apologetic for liberal evangelicalism on familiar lines can hardly do better than to procure this book.

CHARLES W. LOWRY, JR.

Virginia Theological Seminary

Philosophy for the Millions. By J. A. McWilliams. New York: Macmillan, 1942, pp. x + 206. \$2.00.

The author of this tract has tried first of all to state certain basic philosophic principles in simple language for the intelligent layman. Second, he has tried to apply these principles to contemporary problems and issues in such a way as to induce a better understanding of Catholicism in the pagan masses. In the first task, a large measure of success has been achieved. The classical arguments for the existence of God, the natural basis for the State and for democratic individual rights, and finally the general issue between philosophy and modern relativism or subjectivism, are all expressed with pungency and without essential distortion. But so far as the second *apologetic* task is concerned, the book has not achieved its purpose.

First, there are several inaccuracies concerning the many modern movements which the author is attacking. "Socialism," for example, is very inadequately distinguished from "communism" (p. 89). "Gestaltists" are indiscriminately merged with "Pragmatists" and "Naturalists" as "Materialists" in psychology (p. 116). Descartes' "*cogito ergo sum*" is referred to (p. 189) as "an act of faith." Even more misleading for the general reader are some of the assertions about classical philosophy itself. Thus, in spite of many pages defending the rationality of Christianity, and the basic insights of Greek philosophy the author allows himself to say (p. 180) that "the mere recital of the life of Christ made the philosophy of the pagans look like strange, unhuman vagaries of the human mind." At another point (p. 171) he implies that, according to Plato, God was "not greatly concerned about the affairs of men" (cf. *Laws*, Book X). There has been scholastic dispute as to whether logic is a *science* or an *art*, but for the author's unqualified assertion that it is "a kind of machine" (p. 7), it would be difficult to discover any respectable precedent whatsoever.

The author is doubtless right in condemning the materialistic *philosophy* which underlies many modern theories of "evolution," and many modern varieties of "socialism." But the indiscriminate condemnation of "evolution" and "socialism" as such, includes much that is not peculiar to "materialism," and certainly, much that is not sufficiently criticized by the author's argument. The whole discussion of private property is marred by a failure to appreciate the importance of the distinction between capital goods and consumable goods. Thus the author proves that individual *use* is a natural right, but then assumes that "ownership" in the present popular sense is therefore legitimized. He says nothing of the medieval theory of "the just price" nor of the Church's condemnation of usury. Such a dogmatic apologetic for the *status quo*, especially at the present time, is bound to strike the intelligent pagan layman as a confirmation of his view that religion is in fact an "opiate for the poor."

The whole outlook of the author as here expressed is backward rather than forward looking. The return to religion of which *he* sees manifest signs, would be not only a return to the basic principles of *philosophia perennis*, but a return to the whole economic, political, and institutional framework which has emerged from the collapse of this philosophy. His book is not an apology for *philosophia perennis* in itself as it is, and may be in the future, but only for *philosophia perennis* in the past, as it has been, and certainly can no longer be.

JOHN WILD.

Harvard University

A History of the Expansion of Christianity. Vol. V, The Great Century in the Americas, Australasia, and Africa. By Kenneth Scott Latourette. New York: Harpers, 1943, pp. ix + 526. Maps. \$4.00.

"In Asia, as in the Americas, the Pacific, and Africa the period from 1815 to 1914 was the great century." Thus Professor Latourette concludes the fifth volume of his monumental undertaking. The thesis is sound, whether we measure in terms of territory occupied, the men and material engaged, the progress made, or the number of agencies, large or small, participating in emulation or at times in undignified competition. Never before was the missionary task of the Church universal so clearly recognized or so purposefully and courageously performed. At no time in the past was the total membership of the churches so thoroughly and consciously participant in extending the faith. But granted all this, it still remains questionable whether the achievements of the nineteenth century were in themselves so great as to justify devoting to it as much space as is assigned to the "first five centuries," the "thousand years of uncertainty," and the "three centuries of advance" taken together. Doubtless Dr. Latourette would be the first to deny that the nineteenth century is as important as all the preceding eighteen. We have, of course, much more detailed and circumstantial information about the missionary enterprises of the last century than about the earlier periods, and his characteristic thoroughness makes use of all of it. His bibliography of 35 pages—some 600 titles—gives an altogether inadequate idea of the amount of patient research which has gone into the making of this single volume, since it lists only books referred to more than once in the footnotes.

As a work of reference Latourette's *History* is exhaustive, indispensable, unique. It tells a great story in minutest detail. The scholarship and industry it displays compel our profoundest respect. For many a long day it will continue to be the final word in its field. Yet it is to be feared that it will somewhat discourage the average reader by reason of its very minuteness of detail and because some of the chapters

are unmanageably long. The one on "Africa south of the Sahara," for example, extends to almost 150 pages, almost a third of the thick volume.

The present volume covers all the Western Hemisphere except the United States (dealt with in Vol. IV), Australasia and the Pacific islands, Africa and the adjacent islands. Vol. VI will be devoted to Asia, thus completing the story of the "great century." Those who read it will do well to keep several points in mind: the spread of the Gospel and the building of younger churches; the multitude of denominational and other agencies participating; the part played in missionary history by imperialism and colonial expansion, so largely determinative of who has worked in a particular area; the fact that the lands here covered, however cruel their climate and primitive their native populations, nowhere presented the formidable obstacles encountered by Christianity in the ancient cultures of Asia; finally, the highly creditable part our own communion has had in this vast enterprise of Christian heroism and devotion. Modern missions are by no means devoid of martyrs.

P. V. NORWOOD.

Seabury-Western Theological Seminary

The Christian Approach to the Moslem. By James Thayer Addison. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942, pp. x + 365. \$3.75.

Part One of this volume traces, in seven chapters, the historical contacts between Christianity and Islam from the rise of the latter in the seventh century through roughly the next eleven centuries in Europe, North Africa, Egypt, Asia Minor, Palestine and India. The eight chapters of Part Two deal with the political, religious and social factors involved in such attempts as have been made in modern times to preach the Gospel to the people of Turkey, Syria, Egypt, Iran, Arabia, Northern India, the Netherlands Indies and Negro Africa. Part Three describes some of the best modern methods of approach to Moslems together with the care and nurture of converts. There follow appendices on Moslem lands not included in the fuller studies of Part Two: North Africa, The Balkans, Palestine, Russia and Central Asia and Afghanistan, Iraq, China, British Malaya, Philippine Islands and Madagascar. There is an excellent and exhaustive bibliography.

The author makes the point that the evangelisation of the Moslem has never been a primary interest of the Church either in former days or at the present time; and that out of some 27,000 non-Roman missionaries in the world only a very small fraction are engaged in direct work with the 250 million Moslems who inhabit the earth. Because of the modern 'Awakening of Islam' and its vigorous missionary policies, the church today is challenged to press its work among the pagans, and also to deal directly with Islam. It has been found repeatedly that pagans who are converted to Christianity are not susceptible to Moslem attempts at conversion; but that when Islam converts pagans, the latter resist vigorously attempts to christianise them. Direct work with Moslems can be done successfully, but the task will require the combined resources of every major Christian communion. The failures of the past have been in large measure due to wrong methods such as the use of force and the use of a polemical approach. The character of Christ unfailingly attracts the Moslem when He is presented winsomely by a Christlike character.

Every major Christian communion is deeply indebted to the author for opening up a pressing new frontier in modern missions.

JOHN HIGGINS.

Gethsemane Church, Minneapolis

Religion in Soviet Russia, 1917-42. By N. S. Timasheff. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1942, pp. xii + 171. \$2.00.

Now that the Russians have become our companions in arms we have an added reason for interest in the religious policy of the Soviet government. There are several excellent books on the subject, but this is the most recent and certainly as authoritative as any. Timasheff is a Russian exile who has taught at Harvard and is now Professor of Sociology at Fordham. He has written extensively, both here and abroad, on religion in present-day Russia; and in this volume he draws largely—often by way of illustration—upon Russian newspapers and periodicals, official pronouncements of the Communist party and the anti-religious societies, and the observations of discerning foreign visitors. He writes with enviable ease and clarity and with as much objectivity as one has any right to expect. No small part of the value of the book lies in the vividness and freshness of the illustrative material.

Timasheff traces the anti-religious policy of the Soviet regime to its ideological roots in Marxist philosophy; then follows the persecution through its successive phases and techniques—a consistent attitude of hostility expressing itself variously as conditions change. Much of this is already familiar. Most impressive—and not so familiar to some of us—is the cumulative evidence of the survival of religion, often divorced from or only loosely attached to the Church, among the people; its remarkable revival among the intellectuals who stood aloof in the old days; its invasion even of the Communist ranks. As internationalism has turned more and more nationalistic, the "Party" has been forced to restate its philosophy and to recognize that, after all, the Russia of history is "Holy Russia." Timasheff points out that in consequence of this the centre of hostility has shifted from Orthodoxy to the alien Roman Church.

As to the future: The new and outwardly more tolerant religious policy is "merely a compromise, reluctantly accepted for compelling reasons, and contrary to the convictions of the government. Hence, the concessions are precarious. If conditions alter to the advantage of the Communist government, a return to the policy of direct attack is possible with perhaps a general imposition of pressure along the whole 'ideological front.' But such relapses will not necessarily take place." Already the Orthodox Church has found a way to reconcile itself, at least partially, with the new economic order; and the Soviet regime, however doctrinaire in principle, has shown a certain opportunism in practice. Some sort of working compromise is by no means beyond the realm of possibility.

The reliability and freshness of content of this volume have been guaranteed to the present reviewer by Prof. Spinka, himself the author of two books on the subject.

P. V. NORWOOD.

Seabury-Western Theological Seminary

Arthur Selden Lloyd. Alexander C. Zabriskie. New York: Morehouse-Gorham, 1942, pp. v + 312. \$3.00.

A life of Arthur Selden Lloyd, bishop, missionary statesman and pastor, is one biography that ought to have been written. For more than that of any other his life has been bound up influentially with the development of the missionary work of the Episcopal Church during the past fifty years. Dean Zabriskie has performed the task with discrimination and discernment, weaving Lloyd's life into the expanding pattern of the missionary work of the Church so skillfully that each stands out more clearly for the other. The steps by which the missionary administration of the Church was gradually lifted from a rather perfunctory, visionless handling of its

missionary men and money to the present highly efficient organization of the National Council are carefully portrayed. Nowhere has the story of the conception and development of the Nation Wide Campaign and the birth of the idea of the Presiding Bishop and Council been more grippingly related.

Lloyd is pictured as a man of one dominating idea, with practically a passion to bring the Church to a sense of its responsibility for making Christ known. In Jesus Lloyd felt that mankind had been vouchsafed a revelation which made Christ and Christianity wholly unique in the religious experience of the race. To bring that revelation to the knowledge of all was to him the supreme duty of every member of the Christian Church. All else was subordinate. For this purpose a man must be content to risk all and die a pauper. It seemed inevitable that a man with this inextinguishable vision would be called out of parish life into the inner circles of missionary administration.

The story of Lloyd's early days and happy family life is interestingly told, but is not particularly significant. His last years mean little except to provide a sad commentary on how easily a man can be shelved by the Church to whom it owes as much as it does to Lloyd. The life drama reached its climax when, having brought the missionary work and administration of the Church to its highest peak Lloyd apparently lost all in the birth throes of the new order. Yet, since this is the biography of a truly humble Christian, the last act of the drama is not entirely disappointing to the appreciative, sensitive religious soul. To such a one the highest triumph of all may well be registered in the Christlike spirit that rises, as does Lloyd's, victorious over disappointment, frustration and neglect.

It is an excellent biography, a really affecting story. The material presented is not all of equal worth, and certain periods of the life could well be expanded with profit at the expense of the others. It is a vivid cross section of a vital area of the Church's work, and especially fascinating to Church people who were contemporaries of Lloyd. Above all, Dr. Zabriskie has succeeded in sketching the lineaments of a man who reflects in a unique degree the spirit of Him whom he loved to call "The Blessed Master."

HENRY H. SHIRES.

Church Divinity School of the Pacific

Religion and Health. By Seward Hiltner. New York: Macmillan, 1943, pp. xiii + 292. \$2.50.

At last we have an extremely comprehensive book on this subject, which has been capably written and documented by full notes as well as carefully chosen and accurate illustrations. The author's objective, "to survey religion's relationship to health," is admirably achieved as the result of accumulating a tremendous amount of information and then reducing it to a practical medium, filtering it with an objectivity that should appeal to the most rigid scientist. Deans of both medical and theological schools will do well to place this book on their lists of required reading.

Beginning with an excellent resumé of the historical development of both mental hygiene and medical missions, the author cites with commendable impartiality the contributions as well as the errors of both. His concept of a healthy religion (as given in the second chapter) is presented challengingly and with several excellent criteria.

Probably the most significant sections of the book are chapters IV and V which deal with the relation of Christianity to the maintenance of health and cure of illness.

Hiltner points out that there is "positive health" as well as an "absence of illness" and that both religion and medicine have a responsibility in its promotion. These chapters also include an excellent discussion of "miraculous" cures and "spiritual healing."

The author's plea for clergymen to follow the example of doctors and social workers in accepting the "psychosomatic" approach to personality in health and illness is well stated. Likewise, in a section of chapter VII, entitled "The Minister As a Preventive Mental Hygienist," he offers much positive counsel, particularly in regard to worship, preaching, and parish administration.

"Pastoral calling," we are reminded, "is, or should be, one of the great opportunities of the Protestant ministry." Mr. Hiltner's advice in regard to pastoral counselling is both conservative and sound. "The counsellor," he suggests, "is wise to do in all situations a little less than he believes his understanding makes him capable of doing. For one deals here, not with machines, but with the lives of other people who are children of God."

This book deserves slow, concentrated reading rather than a hasty perusal, for it contains too much valuable material to be hurried over.

ROLLIN J. FAIRBANKS.

Massachusetts General Hospital

Religious Trends in English Poetry, Vol. II. By Hoxie Neale Fairchild. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942, pp. xii + 406. \$5.00.

This second volume of Professor Fairchild's extensive study of the course of religious thought in English poetry, carries the work on from 1740 to about 1780; from the decay of rationalism to the advent of romanticism. The question, "What do you say about religion?" is asked of a long line of poets, most of whom have ceased to say anything to anybody except a patient scholar in search of trends. Collectively, however, the answers tell the story of the breakdown of faith in that geometrical type of reason cultivated by pure rationalism into a resultant empiricism, and then of that empiricism into sentimentalism. Set off against a religious frame of reference, these answers become Professor Fairchild's history of the decline of a vital Protestantism into a quasi-religion of "justification by self-esteem."

In the opening chapter, the poetry of the "wits and scoffers" is examined, and there the spirit of scepticism is seen at work undermining the last vestiges of rationalism which carried over beyond the year 1740. The works of Walpole, Churchill, and a dozen others are scrutinized in a way that reveals how far the neo-classical tradition has become vitiated in them and how thoroughly they have lost all faith in the religion of their fathers. Coincidental, however, with this strain was the practical attitude of mind that regarded Christianity as a "sensible device for adding ethical compulsion to the truths of natural religion." Here again many poets are examined; once more the neo-classical tradition in its positive aspects of precision and conciseness is clearly devitalized, and no new life of another sort is yet evident. The poetical specimens offered for examination (and they are certainly representative of this particular good-willed sort of Christianity) are extraordinarily dull reading.

While all this sort of verse was being produced from these two sorts of attitudes, the Evangelical movement was beginning to rise to its full flood. The poetry affected by this movement is immediately notable for its stirrings of a genuine vitality,—a vitality that is not, however, to provide any profound resources. It is notable, too, for its position as a sort of half-way mark between the death of the neo-classical

and the rise of the romantic attitudes. Characteristics of each are evident in a cumulative way in the mass of "Methodist" verse written by the forgotten men and women whose works Professor Fairchild cites in great profusion. Their tiny springs of the new vitality help, however, to nourish the work of four poets who have contributed both to the Christian cause and to literary history. In the work of Young, Smart, and Cowper, the new faith in "feeling" as a spiritual guide unmistakably shines out and illuminates their poetry. With Byram, this is less true. But as poetry of this sort spread out its influence, it became possible for Wharton in his *Essay on the Genius and Writings of Pope* (1756) to conclude that "the sublime and the pathetic are the two chief nerves of all genuine poetry. What is there transcendently sublime or pathetic in Pope?" The "transcendently sublime or pathetic" becomes an increasingly evident characteristic of the poetry which Professor Fairchild examines throughout the rest of the volume. The culmination is, of course, to be found in Gray's famous *Elegy*. In discussing this "most effective species of sacred poetry," as Keble described the *Elegy*, Professor Fairchild aptly comments upon the apparatus which Gray uses to bring off the religious effect. "Once sentimentalism has taken a definite form, its literary media may be cultivated by a conscious artist who has no religion worth mentioning, sentimental or otherwise."

In this literary-religious history of the eighteenth century, Professor Fairchild points out with ample authority how the absence of the vital restraints afforded by the Catholic or even neoclassic attitudes of mind, aids in turning a "religion of justification by faith into a religion of justification by self-esteem." "Self-love, social love, and divine love are indistinguishable," as the eighteenth century runs toward its close. The relation between the weaknesses of the religious situation and the weaknesses in the artistic expression of men representative of the temper of the times is the really valuable contribution of this volume. It is the last chapter that would be the most interesting one for the general reader. Here the trends that have been examined in detail throughout the book are summarized and brought together in a very interesting way. As a literary history undertaken within the framework of a religious reference, it is a careful study, though not a provocative one. With the exception of only one or two of the chapters, it almost assumes the position of a reference book of obscure authors.

MALCOLM STRACHAN.

Groton School

NOTES ON NEW BOOKS

The Nazi Christ. By Eugene S. Tanner. Privately printed, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 1942, pp. v + 53. \$1.50.

New Testament students will remember Schweitzer's vivid description of the wrestling of the Germanic spirit with Jesus of Nazareth, like Jacob wrestling with the angel, conscious that everything our Lord stands for is alien to the Germanic spirit—at least as it has been molded during the past century. Dr. Tanner has given us in this little book a very interesting and important account of the efforts of Naziism to overcome Jesus of Nazareth, enslave him, and force him to do the bidding of the Nazi overlords.

His chapter headings are extremely interesting and indicate the type of treatment: The Nazi Christ is Rescued from Judaism, The Nazi Christ Repudiates Christianity, The Nazi Christ Becomes a Pagan, The Nazi Christ Joins the Protestant Church. A final chapter, Why there Could be a Nazi Christ, places a diagnostic finger upon the weak spot, often overlooked by conservative Christians, which led to all this grotesque misrepresentation and misinterpretation.

Now that we are beginning to realize what we are facing in the Nazi revolution, with its resurgence of barbarism and nihilism, its ridiculous Aryan ideology, and its blasphemous irreligion, it will help us to understand what Christianity faces in the Nazi anti-Christ if we read this book. I commend it for the widest kind of circulation and perusal.

F. C. G.

St. Mark's Gospel: A Short Introduction. By M. D. R. Willink. New York: Macmillan, 1942, pp. viii + 56. \$0.75.

The biblical criticism lying behind this manual for lay people is sometimes debatable—e.g. the apparent acceptance of the tradition in Clement's *Hypotyposes*, the assumption that all of the Little Apocalypse is genuine, the failure to state the values of Pharisaism as well as its defects—yet it is usable and recaptures much of the original spirit and purpose of the gospel, hence it can be recommended to pastors and teachers.

S. E. J.

The Story of the Bible People. By Muriel Streibert Curtis. New York: Macmillan, 1942, pp. xvi + 118. \$1.75.

The author is professor of biblical history at Wellesley College. The book is a survey of the entire Bible intended for children between the ages of 10 and 14. The critical presuppositions and points of view are excellent; the author has much appreciation of religious values. The illustrations are excellent—e.g. St. Paul is made to look Jewish—and so are the maps, "time ladder," and check list for children to use in reading. The intertestamental period is not neglected. Parents and teachers should find the volume useful.

S. E. J.

The Man of the Hour. By Winifred Kirkland. New York: Macmillan, 1942, pp. iv + 171. \$1.75.

This is a series of studies in the life of Christ written clearly and with a freshness of outlook. It makes no pretenses to do anything else for the reader but to make that Life seem more real and to make its message more appealing to the ordinary man or woman. Probably New Testament scholars would quarrel with some of its statements but on reading it this reviewer feels that it would make excellent reference reading for those who are teaching classes on its subject in Church Schools and might also be used with proper handling with discussion groups.

F. A. M.

A Guide to the Prophets. By Sidney Hoenig and Samuel Rosenberg. New York: Bloch Publishing Company, 1942, pp. xiv + 191. \$1.35.

This is an excellent if brief introduction to the prophets of the Hebrew canon including the first four historical books and omitting Daniel. It is intended primarily for use of pupils of High School age or members of adult Bible classes in synagogue schools, but it would be equally good for the same ages in any Church School. Naturally in the latter case additional material might be necessary. The work is carefully done with a limited but good bibliography. The publishers have added a good format.

F. A. M.

The Arabic Commentary of Yefet ben 'Ali the Karaite on the Book of Hosea. By Philip Birnbaum. Philadelphia: Dropsie College, 1942, pp. lxii + 247. \$1.50.

This doctoral dissertation will be of particular interest to specialists. Yefet ben 'Ali lived in Iraq in the tenth century. The Karaites were a Jewish sect which based its religion and thought entirely upon the Bible, and rejected the Rabbis and the Talmud. Dr. Birnbaum has used eight MSS. in his work of editorship. The text is supplemented by notes and cross references to the Bible, the Targums, Ibn Ezra, Kurshi, etc. The author summarizes carefully, the particular characteristics of Yefet in respect to his relation to the Talmud and important commentators such as Sa 'adyah. An English translation of the text presented in this volume would be most valuable, to emphasize the importance and contributions of Jewish scholarship of this period.

P. S. K.

Greek New Testament Word List. Collected by Bruce M. Metzger. Princeton, N. J.: privately printed, 1942, pp. 4, \$0.10, \$1.00 per doz.

Dr. Metzger of Princeton Theological Seminary has compiled a list of 250 words, most of which occur more than 25 times in the New Testament, as a much-needed supplement to the vocabulary in Machen's *New Testament Greek for Beginners*. Instructors who use Machen with beginning classes will find it helpful, and it can be obtained from the author.

S. E. J.

The Life of the Mind. By Emile Cailliet. New York: Macmillan, 1942, pp. x + 79. \$1.25.

This is a summary profession of faith for our day by the Professor of Romance Languages and Literature at the University of Pennsylvania. Dr. Cailliet has brought various insights of many great philosophers to bear upon such problems as emotional-

ism, thinking, freedom, education, culture—and often with a refreshing touch of humor.

Warning against sheer emotionalism, he defines thinking as a rigorous process of clarifying the human situation and stresses the rich intuitions arising from the inner conversation of the soul with the abiding. In particular, Dr. Cailliet regards the lack in modern education and learning of a religious foundation as illustrating world-wide religious decline, attended as that is by degraded cultural standards in which man the individual has become the measure and center of all. Thus the attempt has been made to eliminate the supernatural, and in an age of superficiality "... religion has become to some people a matter of deficiency in iodine or phosphorus." While it is true that the Bible student profits from the stern discipline of scholarship, it is also true that the Liberal Arts' student is in desperate need of that vital understanding which comes only from the Christian faith. If education is to foster freedom and clarification, and if humanism is to regain its original meaning and heritage, they must be grounded in Biblical faith, for the problem of freedom—the great problem both of man and of our day—is in the last analysis that of salvation for "lost" humanity.

In concluding his stimulating little study, the author indicates briefly what he interprets to be signs of a turning of the tide to a revival of faith.

E. G. H.

We Believe. By John J. Moment. New York: Macmillan, 1942, pp. viii + 134. \$1.25.

"All men believe in God," says Dr. Moment in the opening sentence of the first chapter of this book, "atheism being a product not so much of the mind as of the dictionary. Whether or not a man is to call himself an atheist depends altogether on what he means by the word God." He then proceeds to discuss the three creeds—Apostles', Nicene, and Athanasian,—to try to make clear just what the early Christian theologians were trying to say about God. This he does with deep sympathy for the traditional catholic conception of the nature of God, real patristic scholarship, and happy illustration. There is a chapter on each of the three Persons of the Trinity, a chapter on "Man in the Creeds," and a final chapter on the history of the creeds.

Dr. Moment unfortunately does not have anything to say about the doctrine of the church as found in the creeds. If he had discussed it, and with the same sympathy and insight which characterizes his study of the other articles of the creeds, it is hard to see how he could have come out without something very close to the traditional catholic teaching on the church and the ministry. In view of the current discussion of union between the Episcopal Church and the Presbyterian Church a study of the nature of the church from a Presbyterian of Dr. Moments scholarship and understanding would be of great value.

C. L. S.

Invitation to Pilgrimage. By John Baillie. New York: Scribners, 1942, pp. 134. \$1.50.

Professor Baillie has written, in clear and simple terms, a moving apologia for the Christian faith. It is hard to see how anyone could better accomplish the task of meeting the mind of the honest and inquiring unbeliever, and of speaking to the chastened temper of the present moment. Dr. Baillie presupposes the Scottish theological tradition, and as it expresses itself in him, this represents central and balanced Christianity: an appreciation of the reformers' justification doctrine but an insistence

also upon sanctification and good works; a sense of the otherness of God and the uniqueness of his Word but no Barthian anti-rationalism; criticism of the over-optimistic valuation of man which has hitherto been dominant and yet consciousness of the great gifts vouchsafed us through the Renaissance and *Aufklärung*. We wish that Dr. Baillie had said more about the Church and Sacraments, for we feel that he could have spoken some wise words. This volume shows that Anglicans and Presbyterians today are closely akin to one another theologically, and belong together.

S. E. J.

Wartime Pilgrimage. By Clifford P. Morehouse. New York: Morehouse-Gorham, 1942, pp. 237. \$2.00.

This is a fascinating account of the author's wartime journey by air to Canterbury. It would be hard to think of a better way, for one who cannot make the trip himself, to learn what wartime England is like than to read this book. Moreover, being a guest of the English government, the author was able to see much that would be inaccessible to many. London is described in great detail, as is also the great ceremony of the enthronement of Archbishop Temple, on St. George's Day. Newly bombed Exeter is vividly described as well as the battered town of Dover. With the author, we are introduced into British homes, including that of Lady Astor at Cliveden, and become acquainted with many brilliant members of the Cabinet, English Church leaders, and important figures of other church bodies. Descriptions of everyday life in church, theatre, home and market are vivid and fascinating. In addition, the volume is excellently illustrated. In reading this book one enters more fully into a knowledge of the greatness of the British people, and learns to sympathize more deeply with them.

P. S. K.

The Judgment of the Nations. By Christopher Dawson. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942, pp. iv + 222. \$2.50.

Beginning with the usual Roman Catholic attribution of our contemporary chaos to the Reformation, from which are alleged to stem individualistic and secular 'liberalism,' the well known Roman Catholic publicist in the second, constructive part of his latest and best work on Catholic social philosophy advocates federalism in international government, the return to the Law of Nature political philosophy, the restoration of 'spiritual order,' the cooperation of Protestants with the 'Sword of the Spirit' movement in England, the regaining of church unity under the Pope (a *non-federal* solution here!), and Christendom as the soul of a peaceful international society. The stress on freedom and the attack on totalitarianism distinguish the book from the work of some Roman writers who advocate Catholic totalitarianism, and its religious earnestness makes the book impressive.

N. B. N.

The Church Looks Forward. By William Temple and others. New York: Morehouse-Gorham, 1942, pp. 35. \$0.25, \$2.00 per doz.

Here, in attractive form, is the substance of the famous Albert Hall addresses of the Archbishops, the Bishop of Bristol, Miss Knight-Bruce, and Sir Stafford Cripps. Unnumbered tomes are being written on this theme, but this pamphlet is on the "must" list.

S. E. J.

Christian Europe Today. By Adolph Keller. New York: Harpers, 1942, pp. x + 310. \$3.00.

Dr. Keller, director of the European Central Bureau for Relief of Suffering Churches, has travelled much and lectured both in America and Europe and as one of the pioneers in the ecumenical movement he has set himself the task of giving us a comprehensive survey of the present-day relations between Church and State, particularly in Germany and Russia. He presents his own views of what conflicting ideas and forces are at work in the world and what the probable outcome will be for the Church and for Christianity. What will be the result of the present wholesale destruction of church property, of the dispersion of their congregations, of the breaking-up of families, of enforced mass migrations? Will a new sort of Christianity arise from all the suffering caused by the war? "Certain statesmen announce 'the century of the common man.' Will it also bring a spiritual Christian fellowship of the common man instead of the class-church, the pastor's church, the over-organized institution?" This European Protestant deplores the suppression of the Russian church although he acknowledges it had no social program and that "Bolshevism has set free unheard of social constructive energies." He continues to admire—and trust—the Roman church with its "ecclesiastical imperialism" although he knows what was being done to the peasants of the Ukraine, to the natives of Ethiopia, to the common man of Spain, before Hitler upset the *status quo*. He agrees to the Four Freedoms, especially Freedom of Religion (which must include freedom of religious propaganda), but "if the Allies win will Europe be faced with an 'American century'? A certain number of American sects outside the ecumenical fellowship which binds the churches of the old and new world together are already, I hear, seeking new missionary potentialities to save the migrant souls of Europe . . . it can be anticipated that a certain type of apocalyptic and premillenarian piety will be particularly prepared to spread their gospel." Dr. Keller does not try to predict what will happen to Christianity if the Axis wins. However he feels that in the last analysis that religion will win out which best can create a new world order "in which the soul with all its deep values can breathe, and in which society is not a totalitarian mass but a brotherhood based upon liberty and justice." The author has given much material to help us "understand History in the making."

C. E. H. F.

A Christian Basis for the Post-War World. By Ten Leading English Christians. New York: Morehouse-Gorham, 1942, pp. 123. \$1.00.

This volume consists of essays, discussing the Ten Peace Points, by familiar Anglican, Roman, and Protestant religious leaders. It is proof positive, if such were needed, that a new social order, more closely conformable to the Law of Christ, shall be born through the agonies of the present. All of the essays, though of differing value, are courageously suggestive. We know, in reading them, that we are meeting the disciplined thought of trained minds, thoroughly cognizant of the tremendous problems lying ahead. One notes throughout a clear sense of the necessity of greater social control of our economic, political, and industrial life. At the same time, all the writers implicitly insist that Christian freedom shall maintain itself, and that we can hope for advance through voluntary action alone, and not through any form of power politics. Any suggestion of the seemingly easy way of totalitarian coercion is clearly repudiated.

P. S. K.

Jewish Post-War Problems: A Study Course. Unit I, Why Study Post-War Problems. Unit II, The Two World Wars—A Comparison and Contrast. New York: American Jewish Committee, 386 Fourth Ave., 1942, pp. 32, 40. Single unit, \$0.10; course of eight units, \$0.50.

Two pamphlets, brilliantly conceived and executed, packed with information, excellent and deft summaries, thorough studies, carefully selected excerpts from almost everything that is relevant, and full bibliographies.

If one were not interested in the Jewish problem, these booklets would justify themselves as one of the best introductions to the problems of the peace. To Christians who are interested in being of intelligent aid to the post-war Jews, they are invaluable. This means, of course, that all Christians should know them.

A. T. M.

Pageant of the Popes. By John Farrow. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1942, pp. viii + 420. Illus. \$3.50.

The most remarkable thing about this book is that it runs its course of over 400 pages—from St. Peter to the twelfth Pius—without chapter headings or breaks of any kind; a device no doubt adopted to exhibit the continuity of the Papacy, but somewhat discouraging to the reader. Much of the contents could with some effort be gleaned from encyclopedia articles or the larger Church histories. In general, the dark spots and moral lapses, the frequent mistakes in papal policy, are frankly acknowledged and explained as best may be; but error in doctrine is not once admitted. If Liberius signed a compromising creed, he never *taught* or approved of Arianism. Alexander VI was a sinner and a reprobate (though no worse than contemporary secular sovereigns!), but he “never attempted to challenge or change the doctrines of the Church.” Honorius, as if in embarrassment, is dismissed in six noncommittal lines. The policies of recent Pontiffs with regard to Russia, Spain, Mexico, and Fascist Italy, are warmly defended with an evident awareness of liberal criticism. One wonders, too, how it can be “certain” that Peter returned to Jerusalem to “pre-side over” the so-called Apostolic council.

The author is a British naval officer who has done a highly successful life of Father Damien and is now directing the production of propaganda war films. The book is well written, with a sense of the dramatic, but is by no means ‘Hollywood.’ It bears the *imprimatur* of the Archbishop of Los Angeles.

P. V. N.

Aristotle and Anglican Religious Thought. By Victor Lyle Dowdell. Ithaca, N. Y. Cornell University Press, 1942, pp. xii + 103. \$1.50.

This volume comprises the Bohlen Lectures delivered before the Philadelphia Divinity School in 1941. Dr. Dowdell proves conclusively that many Anglican divines from Alexander Geddes in 1452 down to the present time read Aristotle and quoted him. The body of the book is made up of brief studies of different Anglican writers with special references to their knowledge of Aristotle. The book is the fruit of wide reading in Anglican theology and considerable research, but just what effect Aristotle had on the thinking of the individual men or how their study of Aristotle effected the development of Anglican Theology down the centuries is not made very clear.

C. L. S.

The Essence of Anglo-Catholicism. By Walter Herbert Stowe. New York: Morehouse-Gorham, 1942, pp. 63. \$0.50.

Dr. Stowe's pamphlet began as an address to a group of ministers. It is an able, reasoned, scholarly and firm apologia for Anglo-Catholicism, somewhat liberal and irenic in spirit. Parish priests who agree with its point of view will find it a helpful booklet to put into the hands of interested people.

S. E. J.

Christian Belief: A Short Exposition of the Apostles' Creed. By R. H. Malden. New York: Macmillan, 1942, pp. viii + 88. \$0.90.

This little book on the Apostles' Creed is written for use in English schools and also as a guide for the clergy in their confirmation instruction. It is a plain and simple explanation of the meaning of the clauses in the creed, without any new or original interpretations, and reasonably conservative throughout. There are some felicitous illustrations, and occasionally some materialistic conceptions which are not consistent with the author's main contentions.

R. C. M.

Teaching Sermons. By W. K. Lowther Clarke. New York: Macmillan, 1942, pp. viii + 170. \$1.25.

These sermons based on the Church year will be helpful to preachers seeking content for their sermons, to lay leaders who use sermons by others, and to all who enjoy reading what was meant to be spoken. The value of these sermons is that they are full of information. The pulpit has been too little a teaching platform, and the ignorance of the laity is often due to this lack of teaching. While these sermons scarcely ever run more than two pages, they are complete in themselves and suggest that perhaps what we need in our preaching is less padding and more meat in less time.

R. C. M.

The Church in Disrepute. By Bernard Iddings Bell. New York: Harpers, 1943, pp. 152. \$1.50.

Readers of this REVIEW are acquainted with Dr. Bell and his prophetic fire and critical faculties. It is good to hear in these days a voice directed against the spirit of complacency and compromise which poison the Church and may even vitiate its newly found conscience regarding political and economic evils. Dr. Bell pleads for more God in religion, more sanctity, penitence and adoration, and no compromise with the world. Democratic world-programs, he maintains, are as truly selfish and man-centered as fascist or communist ones. While there is some truth in this, it may fairly be asked whether the democratic programs are not more favorable to the very values for which Dr. Bell contends than are the authoritarian systems. One must differ with the author when he whitewashes clericalism in Mexico or pleads for state support or parochial schools or for marriage and birth control rules which would result in downright cruelty; yet one cannot deny that often he speaks a true word of God.

S. E. J.

The Screwtape Letters. By C. S. Lewis. New York: Macmillan, 1943, pp. 160. \$1.50.

The letters of Screwtape, one of the undersecretaries in Hell, to his nephew Wormwood, packed with advice on how best to present both gross and subtle tempta-

tions to weak human beings, are required reading for every pastor and moralist who has any imagination or sense of humor. Their penetration and powerful style make them a classic. They have already been compared to *Pilgrim's Progress*, but they will never appeal to so wide an audience because they make heavier intellectual demands on the reader and are more adapted to the adult who has lived in a sophisticated world and can digest strong meat. This is not to say that they are hard to read—literally one cannot put them down—but they are for the college-bred man, and how they get under his skin!

S. E. J.

How to Be Your Best. By James Gordon Gilkey. New York: Macmillan, 1942, pp. viii + 166. \$1.75.

This is a series of brief essays on the practical problems of everyday living. It is full of suggestions for pastoral counselling, and of illustrations for sermons, as well as a good book to send to people who are having ordinary difficulties.

F. A. M.

Palm Sunday to Easter. By William Temple. New York: Morehouse-Gorham, 1942, pp. 45. \$0.35.

Many will wish to read the addresses delivered by the Archbishop of Canterbury over the radio last Holy Week and Easter, just before his translation to the see of St. Augustine. The very circumstances in which they were given endows them with an historic character.

S. E. J.

Finding God in His Wonderful World. By Phyllis N. Maramarco. Louisville, Ky: Cloister Press, 1942. Teacher's Book, pp. 170. \$1.00. Pupil's Book and Pictures, \$0.60.

This new addition to the Cloister Series is called "A Program in Christian Education for Kindergarten B." The book starts with an introduction on the characteristics of five year old children, which is sound psychology and is full of suggestive material and helpful ideas. The course is made up of six projects to be used through the year designed to help the small child get a sense of God's loving care and to make him feel at home in God's world. The course is not closely related to the Church and the Church year except for some good material on Christmas. In using the course it might be desirable to supplement it with visits to the Church and some experience of worship in the Church. It must be remembered, however, that the projects are set up for periods lasting from an hour and a quarter to two hours and most of the time must necessarily be used for games and play and stories for which there are many excellent suggestions.

C. L. S.

Snowden's Sunday School Lessons, 1943. By Earl L. Douglas. New York: Macmillan, 1942, xiv + 388. \$1.50.

These are based on the International Sunday School Lessons and make use of the American Revised version. To us they seem insufficiently aware of both critical problems and the modern scene. They represent, however, a not unworthy type of central Protestantism which finds its chief interest in the devotional use of the Scriptures, and as such the lessons have value.

Golden Rain. By Patience Strong. New York: Dutton, 1942, pp. 64. \$0.50.

The sentiments on war and the weather expressed by this English authoress seem somehow familiar, and the thought not always consistent. However it is all set down in a very facile rhyming, rhythmic prose that may appeal to those who miss the rhyme and rhythm from our modern poetry.

C. E. H. F.

The Open Door. By Floyd Van Keuren. New York: Harpers, 1942, pp. vi + 112. \$1.25.

Here is a noble little book, a gallant attempt to explain as simply as possible the secret of the source of a Christian's strength. Told in the form of a parable, the idea that the Social Gospel in itself is not enough is entwined in the story of a cripple's triumph over pain and his solving of some of the problems of modern life through studying the Christ of the Gospels until He became a living, loving, ever-present Friend-in-need. "Resourcefulness and ingenuity seemed to come to me out of communion with Him. . . . He is not a magician . . . but He is the Way."

C. E. H. F.

Webster's Dictionary of Synonyms. G. and C. Merriam Co., Springfield, Mass. 1942. Pp. xxxiv + 907. \$3.50; with thumb index, \$4.00.

This is the finest book of synonyms I have ever seen. Since it is arranged alphabetically, it is much more convenient to use than even the latest edition of Roget's *Thesaurus*. The fine discriminations between synonyms and their congeners—analogue words, antonyms, and contrasted words—are of very great importance to everyone who is interested in using the English language with accuracy and skill. This ought to include everyone in the Episcopal Church, not to say Christians everywhere in America, and especially the clergy—certainly all persons who write and all who speak publicly!

One of the defects of our current theology is surely its lack of sharp-edged, clear-cut distinction in thought and expression. We are in no danger of overdefiniteness! Much of our theological writing today is not only obscure but opaque, and careless in style. This dictionary of synonyms ought to be on the desk of every writer and preacher, not as an aid in the improvement of his vocabulary but as a whetstone for the sharpening of his tools! All of the longer articles where these clear discriminations are to be found are illustrated by quotations from English writers, from Shakespeare to our own contemporaries. These illustrations are well chosen and are really fascinating, at least for anyone interested in the rich variety and resourcefulness of our English tongue.

It should be added that the work is entirely new and is not simply a compilation of the information on synonyms in the current second edition of *Webster's New International Dictionary*.

F. C. G.

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